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PREFACE 
The voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance has a his-
tory which is as long as the history of the price theory of private goods, 
if the number of years is the basis for the length of history. However, 
the price theory of public goods has not achieved the level of accepta-
bility which the price theory of private goods has achieved. 
The acceptance of the price theory of public finance by economists 
in the future will depend, to a large extent, upon its application to 
real world situations . However, the extent to which it is likely to be 
applied by economists in the future will probably depend upon the extent 
to which certain problems and criticisms of the theory are understood. 
This dissertation represents an attempt to evaluate the problems 
and criticisms of the price theory of public finance . All of the speci-
fic problems and criticisms could not be treated comprehensively in this 
paper but I believe that the ones which are most likely to act as barriers 
to the future application of the theory have been treated. The conclu-
sions derived from the analysis of prob l ems and criticisms do not pro-
vide a basis for discussing the specific future applications of the 
theory . However, the conclusions from this type of analysis do provide 
a basis for making some general statements about broad areas of future 
application of the theory . 
Despite this recognition of the importance of future applications 
of the theory, the primary theme of the dissertation is the analysis of 
iii 
the problems and criticisms of the price theory of public finance. I 
believe that once these problems and criticisms are more fully under-
stood, specific applications of the theory will more or less naturally 
follow . The full scope of possible problems cannot be known until they 
arise from attempts to make specific applications of the theory. How-
ever, the motivation to even attempt to apply the theory will not exist 
until the general criticisms of the theory have been thoroughly analyzed 
and understood . 
My indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. Ansel M. Sharp who started 
me into the study of the price theory of public finance and who as my 
dissertation adviser guided me away from many of the side issues into 
which I would have otherwise undoubtedly strayed . The cooperation and 
help of Dr . Julian H. Bradsher i n the editing of. early drafts of the 
entire dissertation and of Dr . Richard H. Leftwich in evaluating some 
of the models developed in Chapters IV and V also deserves special 
acknowledgement . The editing of the final rough draft by Mrs. Ansel 
Sharp gave me greater confidence in the finished dissertation and is, 
therefore, acknowledged . Acknowledgement is also made of the cooperation 
of Dean Helmer E. Sorenson and Dr . Wilton T. Anderson who, as members 
of my cormnittee from outside the Department of Economics, kep t their 
doors open to me and who promptly cooperated with Dr . Sharp, Dr. Bradsher 
and me . 
I also wish to acknowledge the work and loyalty of my family. 
Barbara, my wife, typed the many early drafts of the dissertation de-
spite the fact that she was expecting our third child in May, 1964 . Her 
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work of typing, however, could not have been accomplished without the 
cooperation of our first two children, Pamela and Paul. 
Last, but not least, I wish to acknowledge the work of Mrs. Karen 
Konstas in typing the final draft of the dissertation. She took over 
the job of doing the final typing with a very limited time in which to 
complete the typing of material which was not familiar to her. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
+he voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance had its 
origin in the benefit approach to taxation but it never has had the 
widespread acceptance enjoyed by the benefit approach in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The causes of this lack of acceptance of 
the voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance is the pri-
mary theme of this dissertation. More specificially, an attempt is made 
to show that the criticisms of the theory are not a sufficient reason to 
completely reject the theory. In the process of analyzing the major 
criticisms of the price theory of public finance, suggested approaches to 
the theory and to the application of the theory to the political process 
are made. 
There are many aspects to the voluntary exchange approach to public 
finance, but its essence can be understood by simply considering it to be 
the application of the whole body of price theory to the problem of the 
supply of goods and services by the govet'I\ment. This view of the theory 
of public finance requires that the revenues of the government (taxes) be 
considered together with the expenditures of the government. The expendi-
tures of government must be considered as costs of producing goods and 
services. The government is, thus, considered to be a producer or firm 
in the economy, similar to private firms. Economists have not generally 
accepted this concept of the government. In fact, economists have often 
1 
2 
discussed the expenditure activities of the government in terms of the 
government being a consumer. The concept of the government as a consumer 
may have been an outgrowth of Adam Smith's concept that some of the ex-
penditures of the sovereign are for unproductive labor. The unproductive 
labor concept has dropped out of economic literature but not the concept 
that the government consumes goods and services when it makes expenditures. 
The nonacceptance of the concept of the government as a producer enters 
the discussion throughout this dissertation. 
The most important theoretical concepts which must be accepted in 
order to accept the price theory of public finance are related to the re-
vealing of preferences for public goods. The acceptance of the price theory 
of public finance implies the acceptance of the concept that public goods 
do provide satisfaction to the individual and that the individual associ-
ates the satisfaction with the quantity of the public goods available to 
him . It is also implied that the individual will reveal his preferences 
for public goods if given the opportunity o The nonacceptance of these con-
cepts is discussed in the first part of Chapter IV. 
Richard Ao Musgrave has placed importance on the determination of a 
single best solution in the allocation of resources when public goods are 
involved. The question of a single best solution when public goods are 
involved is treated in t he last part of Chapter IV and in Chapter V. The 
latter chapter is a suggested approach to the price theory of public 
finance . A model is developed which attempts to show a single best 
so lution analogous to the Pareto optimumo 
The acceptance of t he price theory of public finance does require 
that taxes be viewed as a price paid for goods and services . The taxpayer 
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is a taxpayer-buyer. If the political organization is taken into consid-
eration, the taxpayer can be considered to be a voter-buyer, since he in-
dicates the quantity of goods and services he desires through his vote 
rather than through the taxes paid . Taxes are the prices paid for the 
goods and services actually suppliedj but the determination of what quan-
tities of goods and services should be supplied is based on the taxpayers 9 
voting in the political process. Therefore, the determination of the in-
dividual's taxes is considered to be one of allocating the value or costs 
of the goods and services . Economists have not generally accepted the 
concept that taxes are a price or an allocation of value or costs . I n 
fact, taxes are often considered to be little more than a form of coercive 
activity of government which is inherent in the nature of the state . The 
nonacceptance of the concept that taxes are a price paid for goods and 
services is di_scussed in Chapter VI. 
The acceptance of the taxpayer as a voter-buyer may also be implied 
in the acceptance of the price theory of public finance. In any casej 
the concept of the voter-buyer does imply the existence of a particular 
type of political mechanism. The voter-buyer must not only want to re-
veal his preferences for public good~ he must have a means by which to do 
so . Therefore, the political mechanism cannot be ignored by an economist 
accepting the price theory of public finance.. The effect which the poli-
tical mechanism has upon the degree of coercion that exists in taxation 
is discussed. in the last part of Chapter VI. Chapter VII- represents a 
suggested approach to the application of the model suggested in Chapter V 
to the problem of . the role of government in the production of public goods . 
The implications of four policy rules of government ~hich determine the 
role of government in the production of goods are considered. 
4 
The sunnnary and conclusions of the dissertation are presented in 
Chapter VIII. An attempt is made to bring together all of the more or less 
independent conclusions derived from the analysis of various criticisms 
and problems of the price theory approach to public finance in a manner 
which will indicate the direction future work on the theory will have to 
take if the theory is to gain the acceptance of other economists . Special 
attention is also given to the applicability and limitations of the theory 
to three specific areas of study in public finance. The three areas of 
study considered are: (1) as an explanation of the real world, (2) as a 
framework for discussing theoretical concepts of public finance in general 9 
and (3) as a framework for policy proposals. The choice of the three 
areas of application to be considered were determined by the analysis of 
the criticisms of the theory . Other areas of application may be of equal 
importance but the framework of the analysis which precedes the conclu-
sions would have to be expanded in order to adequ.ately discuss the appli-
cation of the theory to . these other areas of public finance. 
Before entering into the problem of acceptance or nonacceptance of 
the price theory of public finance 9 it is necessary to establish what the 
acceptance of theory has implied to economists in the past . Therefore, 
Chapters II and III review some of the specific formulati ons of the vol-
untary exchange or price theory of public finance which have developed 
in the history of thought in public finance . Chapter II is a presenta-
tion of the nongraphical models of the theory . These nongraphical models 
indicate that the early formulations of the theory emphasized particular 
5 
aspects of price theory analysis. The graphical models of the theory pre-
sented in Chapter III provide a broader application of price theory ~naly-
sis to public finance and more clearly point out the contemporary criticisms 
of the theory. 
CHAPTER .II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE OR PRICE THEORY 
OF PUBLIC FINANCE: NONGRAPHICAL MODELS 
There are three basic economic questions which are to be answered 
once the government is accepted as a producer of goods and service,s: 
(1) which goods and services shall be produced by the government; (2) what 
quantity of these goods and services shall be produced; and (3) what tax 
(price) shall be charged for the goods and services which are produced? 
The government has not generally been accepted as a producer of goods 
and services in the study of public financeo The usual approach to the 
study of public finance is to limit the use of economic analysis and econo-
mic criteria to the problems of taxation, since taxation affects the indi-
vidual's ability to purchase private goodso Thus» taxation has been the 
center of emphasis in the study of public finance . However, in contempor-
ary public finance» some attention has also been given to the fiscal 
activities of government in relation to the ef f ects upon aggregate employ-
1 
ment and national incomeo In any case ~ the expenditure activities of 
1 Ao Co Pigou defines public finance so . that .it does not include what 
and how much to produce but the definition .does include the determination 
of how much to charge for government .goods and services o He also states 
that since the turn of the twentieth century public finance has been con-
sidered to include the study of public expenditures insofar as . they may 
affect employment o A Study in .Public Fi nan.ce . (Lon.don~ 19l+9.).,. p .• 2.4 .o 
6 
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government are considered as one pro~lem and t axes which pay for these ex-
penditures are considered as another problem. 
The ability to pay theory of taxati on which developed in the classical 
school of economic thought is consistent with the generally accepted 
approach to public finance. The government may or may not be accepted as 
a producer of goods and services. Also, the expenditure activities of 
government may or may not be considered to benefit individuals. 2 In any 
case, the determination of government expenditure activities is consid-
ered independently from the determination of taxes. 
The early ability to pay approaches related taxes to income. In the 
classical school of thought, the ability to pay theory became a theory 
based on equal sacrifice of taxpayers . The meaning of equal sacriftce, 
however» varied from economist to economist . Three disti nct types of equal 
sacrifice which developed were equal absolute sacrifice, equal proportional 
3 
sacrifice and equal marginal sacrifice . The latter became knows as the 
least aggregate sacrifice approach. Each represents an attempt to apply 
economic criteria to the problem of taxation so as to provide the govern-
ment with an obj ective basis for determini ng taxes. Despite these attempts 
to use an economic criterion based on equal sacrifice to the problem of 
taxation, the ability to pay economists did not reach agreement as to the 
2 Ursula K. Hicks accepts the government as a producer of economic 
goods which provide satisfaction to. the . individual • . However~ she still 
limits the use of economic analysis and economic cri teri a to the question 
of taxation because the determination of what and how much to produce is 
a part of the political process ~ Public Finance (New York, 1947), p . 11 . 
3 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Publ ic Fi nance (New York, 1959)~ 
pp . 95-96 . 
8 
tax rate implied by the ability to pay principle of taxation o It has now 
been shown that the shape of the individual income utility function must 
be known in order to determine the type of tax implied by the various equal 
sacrifice theorieso 4 
Adam Smith used the phrase "in proportion to their respective abili-
5· 
ties" in his first maxim of taxation. Some economists have considered 
this as a basis for the ability to pay theory of taxation in the classical 
6 
school of economic thought. However, Book V of ~ Wealth of Nations 
constitutes an application of the ba~ic principles of the benefit theory 
of taxation rather than the ability to pay theory. In fact 9 Book Vin 
many respects constitutes a broader application of the benefit theory than 
that applied by many later followers of the theory since Smith also con-
7 
sidered what the government should supply. 
The benefit theory of taxation as it developed in the classical school 
of economic thought was primarily concerned with the question of how much 
should be charged for the goods and services produced by the government. 
The government was not always considered as a producer of economic goods 
by these economists but they did accept the idea that government expendi-
tures provide benefits to individuals. Accordingly, the individual should 
pay taxes according to the benefits received. Whether the theory implied 
4 Ibid., p. 98. 
5Adam Smith,~ Wealth £1 Nations, edo Edwin Cannan (New York, 1937), 
p O 777 0 
6Musgrave, p. 660 
7 Smith, pp. 689-7120 
9 
progressive, proportional or regressive taxes has not been agreed upono 
However, it appears that the majority of the followers of the benefit 
theory have accepted proportional tax rates (i.e., most of them have 
assumed that benefits received by the individual are proportional to in-
come)o 
The insurance-premium theory of taxation which also developed in the 
classical school of economic thought was merely a special form of the 
8 benefit theory of taxationo It developed in an atmosphere where the em-
phasis in political thought was on the protective role of government o9 
The political criterion of protection of the individual was accepted as 
the basis for determining what activities the government should undertake . 
The taxes to pay for these activities were considered to be analogous to 
the payment of an insurance premium since the benefits received from the 
activities were analogous to the benefits received from insurance (i . e o, 
protection)o 
The voluntary exchange approach to public finance did not develop into 
a distinct approach until the latter part of the nineteenth century when 
economists of continental Europe expanded the benefit theory to other pro-
blemso The approach represents an extension of the benefit theory to the 
8 Edwin Ro Ao Seligman 11 Studies in Publi c Finance (New YorkP 1925)j 
PPo 182-190 0 
9 Although Jeremy Bentham is well known for his concept that the 
government should provide the greatest . good for . the greatest number 11 he 
limited the function of government to the . pr otection of the individual 
from pain o The greatest . good for the greates t number was believed to 
follow if the government . did limit its activities to those that provided 
the individual with protection from pai n . See J eremy Bentham, Benthami anal) . 
ed o John Hill Burton (London, 1843) and Jeremy Benthamp The Theory of 
Legislation, ed. Co K. Ogden (New York, 1931). 
10 
questions of what and how much should be produced by t he government . In 
the approach, government ac.tivi ty .. w:as not to be limiten to the political 
criterion of protection or to any other political criteria. The expendi-
ture activities of government were to follow or to be explained in terms 
of economic criteria with economic analysis . Basic to the voluntary ex-
change approach is the concept that the determination of government ex-
penditures and taxes should be made simultaneously. Expenditures and 
revenues of the government are part of one process just as they are to a 
private business firm. 
The early writers in the deve lopment of the voluntary exchange 
approach realized that they could not ignore the political process. Even 
if economic criteria was to be applied to the production of goods and 
services produced by the government, the productive activity was directly 
determined in the political process. However, the fact that the politi-
cal process was discussed in considerabl e detail should not distract from 
the main point that each of these early writers was attempting to apply 
price theory concepts to the problem of the supply of public goods. Each 
of the nongraphical models of the voluntary exchange approach to public 
finance emphasizes different aspects of price theory analysis. However» 
they all consider the government as a producer of economic goods and they 
all attempt to answer all three economic questi ons about the supply of 
these goods in terms _of price . theory . concepts . 
Maffeo Pantaleoni 
One of the earliest complete formulations of a voluntary exchange 
approach to public finance was made by an I talian economist, Maffeo 
11 
10 Pantaleoni, in 1883. Pantaleon! attempted to develop an explanation of 
how parliament should determine public expenditures so that they would be 
consistent with the exchange theories of W. S. Jevons and Leon Walras. 
Parliament was accepted as the sole determiner of the expenditures of the 
government but Pantaleoni stated as a hypothesis that parliament should 
base its judgments on economic and political facts. By doing this, parlia-
ment could answer the basic economic questions of what to produce, how 
much to produce and how to distribute the costs of the productive activi-
ties of the government with the least effects upon the normal operat i ons 
of the market system of private production . 
Pantaleoni takes an aggregate approach in that he considers that 
parliament must compare the total expenditure of government with the total 
revenue of government . Parliament should compare the sacrifice caused in 
the private sector by government's raising of revenues with the satisfac-
tions created in the private sector when expenditures are made by the 
government . Each expenditure was not to be compared with a corresponding 
revenue . Each expenditure was to be judged by its effect upon the total 
expenditure. Likewise, each revenue source was to be judged by its effect 
upon the total revenue collections measured as the sacrifice made by the 
private sector . Thus~ Pantaleonie s concept involved t he marginal utility 
of expenditure made by the government or public sector of the economy 
which was to be equated with the marginal utility of expenditure of the 
10 Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, Classics in the Theory of 
Public Finance (London, 1958), pp . 16- 27~ f or an English translation of 
part of Pantaleoni's book, Scritti varii di Economia . 
12 
11 private sector of the economy . Particular expenditures and particular 
taxes in the budget of the government can then be determined by consider-
12 ing their affect on the established equilibrium. 
The marginal utility of expenditure in the private sector of the 
economy set the equilibrium condition which the total budget of the govern-
ment must satisfy . The problem of parliament was to discover the equili-
brium condition and then to determine the particular expenditures and 
particular revenues which will satisfy the equilibrium condition according 
to the economic theory of exchange . 
The separation of the private sector of the economy and the public 
sector of the economy which developed in the classical and marginal schools 
of economics was maintained by Pantaleoni but the two sectors were linked 
13 by an economic eq.uilibri um condition . To Pantaleoni, the equilibrium 
of the private sector was assured by the existence of the market mechanism 
but the equilibrium of the public sector was merely the goal for which 
parliament should strive . However, Pantaleoni believed that the average 
intelligence of parliament could achieve the goal he set for parliament 
and that if nothing else can be said at least the average intelligence of 
parliament is the 100st likely means of accomplishing the goal . 
11 Equilibrium condition: MUE publi c . goods= MUE private goods . 
Pantaleoni did not put the equi librium condition in mathematical form . 
12 Equilibrium condition ~ 
MUl MU2 
--= -- = Tax1 Tax2 
MU 
= _n_ = MUE public goods . Tax 
n 
13Further consideration will be given t o t he problems of these equi-
librium concepts in Chapter III. 
13 
Ugo Mazzo.la 
14 Another Italian, Ugo Mazzola in 1890, attempted to give a theore-
tical explanation of the equilibrium condition in the supply of public 
goods and services. The political process by which equilibrium could be 
accomplished plays no part in the theoretical model developed by Mazzola. 
In other words, Mazzo l a attempted to establish precisely the equilibrium 
conditions which exist for public goods and which the government must 
attempt to fulfill if it is to avoid repercussions created when disequi-
librium exists with respect to the supply of public goods . 
Mazzola's model was limited to public goods which had the character-
istics of indivisibility of consumption and/or of joint satisfaction . All 
other goods and services supplied by t he government could be handled through 
the market mechanism by charging fees for these goods and services. Goods 
and services which have the characteristics of indivisibili ty of consump-
tion and/or of joint satisfaction were considered to be public goods which 
could not be supplied through the market mechanism because of their uni-
que characteristics. The entire roodel, however 9 depends upon two other 
assumptions: (1) These public goods give no satisfaction in and of them-
selves (i.e., the satisfaction associated with the public good is derived 
through the consumption of all other goods and services); (2) All other 
goods and services are supplied through the market mechanism and indivi-
duals attempt to maximize t heir satisfaction through the consumption of 
14 Musgrave and Peacock, pp . 37-47 for an English translation of one 
chapter of Mazzola's book, 1 dati scientici delle finanza publica . 
14 
goods and services acquired in the market place. The first of these basic 
assumptions is of great importance because it expresses the concept of 
the complementary nature of public goods. However, Mazzola's particular 
formulation of this complementary nature of public goods is a difficult 
one to justify since it assumes that public goods are completely comple-
mentary and yield no satisfaction except in relation to the consumption 
of each nonpublic good. 
Mazzola assumed that since the public goods were complementary to the 
consumption of all other goods, the marginal utility (final degree of 
utility) of the public goods was a part of marginal utility considered in 
the attempt to maximize satisfaction in the consumption of all other non-
public goods. The individual in attempting to maximize his satisfaction 
of a nonpublic good, therefore 9 takes into consideration the fact that if 
he buys x quantity of the nonpublic good, he wants x1 quantity of public 
goods supplied. The individual also simultaneously takes into considera-
tion the fact that the supply of x1 quantity of public good will cost T1 
a100unt in taxes. The amount of taxes T1 , however, is measured in terms 
of the marginal utility of the nonpublic good which will have to be given 
up to obtain x1 quantity of public goods . The amount of marginal utility 
from the consumption of nonpubli c goods which the individual is. willing 
15 to give up is equal to the marginal utility of x1 quantity of public goods. 
15 This implies that the margi nal utility of a nonpubl i c good has 
two equal parts. One part associated with its consumption and one with 
the consumption of the publi c good . 
15 . 
16 This is in accordance with Wo So Jevons' concept, that the maximization 
of satisfaction, where the problem is the distribution of a comnodity in 
different uses, requires the equalization of marginal utilities of the 
good in its various useso 17 Therefore, the marginal utility of the public 
good is equated with the price (tax) of the public good, at the time the 
individual makes his decision to maximize his satisfaction by purchasing 
a nonpublic good. No consumer surplus can exist because the mar$inal 
utility of the public good is determined by the marginal utility of the 
quantity of the nonpublic good actually purchased . The public good has 
no marginal utility independent of the purchase of the nonpublic good. 
Disequilibrium will exist whenever the political process does not 
make available, to the given individual, x1 quantity of the public good o 
The supply of a different quantity of public goods does not change the 
marginal utility of the public good to the i ndividual since this is de-
termined by his consumption of nonpublic goods o Thus, disequilibrium im-
plies that the given individual must pay for the supply of a quantity of 
the public good which maximizes someone else's satisfaction but not his 
own . To Mazzola, this will occur when the political process favors one 
class of society over another. Implicit in this conclusion is the 
assumption that each individual in a particular class of society would 
16 W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (4th ed o, London, 
1924), pp . 58-61. 
17 Mazzola has implicitly assumed that, since the public good and non-
public good have one utility function for the . two goods, they can be 
treated as one good with different uses o 
16 
18 
want the same quantity of the public good and that each class of society 
would want a different quantity of public goods. However, if the latter 
is true then equilibrium cannot exist for all of society and the problem 
of the political mechanism becomes one of deciding which class of society 
should be permitted to maximize its satisfaction. However, the important 
thing to Mazzola was that he believed he had discovered the general rule 
for the supply of public goods in the complementary nature of public 
goods. 
EmU Sax 
Emil Sax, a German economist in 1924, presented another complete 
theoretical model of the public economy which rejected Mazzola's basic 
assumption of the complementary nature of public goods as well as many of 
19 the other earlier formulations of the voluntary exchange approach. Sax 
rejected the "political school" (i . e . , Pantaleoni) because they centered 
on the determination of aggregate revenues and expenditures of the govern-
ment by considering the political process. To Sax, the political pro-
cess was important and can cause equilibrium or disequilibrium but the 
political process cannot affect the equi librium conditions which exist in 
the economy . Sax also rejected the "individuaUs tic school" (i .e . , 
18 The assumption i s that all individuals of a particular class of 
society have the same utility function for all nonpublic goodsp since this 
is the only way in which they could experience the same marginal utility 
for the public good . 
19 Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, Classics i n the Theory of 
Public Finance (London, 1958)p pp . 177-189 f or an English translation of 
part of Sax's essay, Di e Wertungstheorie der Steuer . 
17 
Wicksell and Lindahl) because they centered on the measurement of the 
individual's subjective evaluation of each expenditure of government and 
20 its source of revenue. To Sax, the individual subjective evaluation 
was important and was a part of the necessary conditions for equilibrium 
but the individual evaluation did not have to be precisely met by the 
government to maintain the equilibrium of the system. 
Sax's theory followed the political school in establishing the aggre-
gate level of expenditures and revenues separate from the individual items 
of expenditure and revenue. The emphasis, however, was on the effects 
of the revenue side of the budget rather than the expenditure side of the 
budget. The society as a collective association was to determine the 
aggregate amount of possible private consumption which they were willing 
to give up to have collective goods and services supplied. This would 
approximate the total cost of government goods and services by establish-
ing the total revenue to be collected through taxation. The particular 
types of expenditures to be made by the government were to be established 
by society as a collective association through the process of setting up 
a list of public goods and services ranked accordi ng to the intensity of 
need to the society as a whole . Equilibrium of the aggregate expenditures 
and revenues of the government, therefore, depends upon the political 
mechanism properly listing the goods and ser vices and supplying them in 
the order of the intensity of society's needs and upon the political 
mechanism properly determining the aggregate amount of private consump-
tion which the collective association is wi lli ng to give up . Total 
20 See page 27 below for an analysis of the Lindahl-Wicksell approach . 
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expenditures did not have to be compared to the total tax revenues for 
equilibrium to exist because the government has other sources of revenue, 
such as borrowing. The total expenditures of government must be compared 
with total revenues and not just tax revenues for equilibrium to exist. 
On the revenue side of the budget, Sax believed that, once ,the aggre-
gate amount of taxes to be collected was determined, the individual tax 
shares must be determined by the political mechanism by following the 
economic principle of equivalence. The principle of equivalence provides 
the connection between the relative tax share and the aggregate amount of 
taxes to be collected. For equilibrium to exist, the total tax collected 
must approximate the sum of the individual evaluations of all individuals 
in society. In other words, the collective evaluation of the amount of 
private consumption which society is willing to give up must be based 
on the same factors which affect the individual's subjective evaluation 
of the value of the public goods and services to be supplied by the 
government. The factors which affect the individual subjective evalua-
tion are the individual wealth that exists in the society and the diver-
gence from the average intensity of needs caused by such factors as the 
amount of population which are too old to work, too young to work, etc . 
These factors, therefore, form the cri teria for the principle of equi-
valence in taxation ~ The indivi dual t ax share must be based on the in-
dividual's wealth which indicates the average intensity of need for pub-
lic goods and on the variance from the aver age intensity of need caused 
by special factors . The assumption is made that the intensity of need 
varies i nversely in propor tion to weal t h . 
19 
These criteria establishp the average intensity of need for each 
level of wealth holders, and the other factors need only be considered as 
they are most likely to affect the average o Other individual differences 
from the average do not have to be considered because equilibrium is 
maintained just so long as the individual subjective evaluations are rea-
sonably approximated o In other words, the equilibrium of the revenue 
side of the budget requires only that the total tax bill approximate the 
sum of the individualfs subjective evaluation of what private consumption 
they are willing to give up to have public goods supplied, and that the 
individual tax share approximate the individual subjective evaluation of 
the public goods which are supplied. Equilibrium is not disturbed as 
long as the approximations are reasonably close and this can be accom-
plished by considering the factors considered under the principle of equi-
valence in taxation. 
Antonio DeVit i DeMarco 
In 1936, Antonio DeViti DeMarco presented another formulation of the 
21 
voluntary exchange approach to public financeo It was not a theoreti-
cal presentation like those of Mazzola or Sax but it did contain an 
application of price theory to all of public finance and this is the 
essence of the voluntary exchange approacho DeMarco ' s presentation is 
more of an explanation and history of all of the specific concepts of 
of public finance . Therefore, it deals primarily with the tax side but 
21 Antonio DeViti DeMarco, The Firs t Pri nciples of Public Finance, 
tro Edith Pavlo Marget (London, 1950) 0 
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DeMarco carefully states at the beginning that public finance is not just 
the study of taxation, politics or law . "The discipline which gives the 
really necessary and fundamental explanation of the phenomena of public 
22 finance is, however, economics o'' No attempt is made to build an econo-
mic model or establish equilibri um conditions but the explanation of every 
concept in public finance is in terms of price or value theory . In other 
words, DeMarco does not build a model but rather he consistently applies 
the concepts and models of value theory to the concepts and problems of 
public finance. 
DeMarco's definiti on of public finance or public economics gives some 
indication of the extent to which he follows the tradition of earlier 
Italian economists who advanced the voluntary exchange approach and of 
the extent to which he added to their approach by extending all of the 
concepts of value theory to .public . finance ., 
It [public economi cs] investi gates the conditions to which 
the productive activity of the State must be subjected .in order 
that the choice .2£ ~ public . services -which -~ ·-!.£· be produced, 
the determination tl their .respective . amounts, the distribution 
of ~ costs among the .consumers~ -·~ " 'll .. may_ take .place accord-
ing to the principles of theory of value--that is, with the 
least possible waste .of private wealth ~ in order to attain the 
greatest satisfaction of collective needs .23 
This defi nition of public economics contains all of the elements of 
the voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance . All three of 
the economic problems related to public finance are specifically stated 
in relation to the pr inciples of the theory of value (price theory) . The 
22 Ibid . , p . 34 . 
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function and goal of public economics is to investigate the means of 
attaining the greatest satisfaction of col lective needs with the least 
possible waste of private wealth . The relationship of this function and 
goal to price theory is obvious . Also p the definition considers the state 
as a producer of goods and services and the taxpayer as a consumer. The 
state is a producer of goods and services not just when the goods resemble 
goods which can be supplied through the market mechanism but whenever the 
state satisfies collecti ve needs . 
Public goods and services ar e classifi ed as either "Special Public 
Services" or "General Public Services . " A public good is in the form.er 
classification if it meets both of the following criteria: (1) The supply 
of the service must be technically di vis i ble into salable units, (2) The 
24 
service must be constantl y demanded by i ndividuals . Public goods and 
services fall into the second classification , if they do not meet both of 
the foregoing criteria . 
Special public services r equire fee type pricing which makes their 
supply somewhat analogous t o privat e goods and services . However , s i nce 
the government can act monopolisti cally in the supp l y of public goods and 
services, a rule of average cost pricing mus t be adopt ed by t he govern-
ment . General public services , on t he other hand, are mor e uni que i n t hat 
they are generally supplied by t he government and requi re .a tax t ype of 
24 DeMarco believes t hat s ome servi ces s uch as publ ic safety are an 
example of a service whi ch is not constantl y demanded by i ndi viduals . 
The demand only recurs when public s afety i s actually i mpai r ed . Danger 
is always present but the i ndividual demand for protection i s dormant un-
til the danger i s recogni zed by t he fact that t he se rvice has not been 
supplied and someone's safet y has not been protec ted . 
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pricing o With general public services, individual consumption is an un-
known quantityo However, this does not rule out the use of value theory 
in answering the economic questions about the supply of general public 
serviceso Consumption can be ass umed to be proportional to incomeo It 
is an assumption but DeMarco contends that it has both an empirical and 
a logical foundationo 
Based on his assumption about the relationship between consumption 
and income, DeMarco develops a concept of individual net income. The con-
cept is analogous to the value added concept of gross nationai product 
in that individual net incomes can be summed to arrive at a measure of 
national income. No income is to be counted twice and no income is to be 
deducted which is not counted as income of some other individual o De-
veloped, in this manner 9 individual net income is considered an indication 
of consumption and, therefore, the measure of individual taxable income. 
If the sum of the individual taxable incomes is greater than national in-
come, double taxation exists o If the sum of the individual taxable in-
comes is less than nat i onal income, price discrimination exists in the 
supply of public goods and services o 
Price discrimination can exist because of the monopolistic nature of 
the government in the supply of goods and servi ces o However, DeMarco al so 
recognizes that the single tax-price is based upon the concepts of pure 
competition and that care must be used in its application to pub l ic goods 
and services o Multiple pricing does not necessarily mean price discrim-
ination exists 9 according to DeMarco o Price di scrimination only occurs 
with general publ ic services when an individual net income is not taxed 
on a proportional basis with all othe r individual net i ncomes . Multiple 
23 
pricing, therefore, exists for general public services in that different 
individuals pay different prices but price discrimination only occurs 
25 
when an individual taxable income receives special treatment. Multiple 
pricing proportionate to individual taxable i ncome is based on consump-
tion and thereby follows the concepts of value theory . Multiple pricing 
based on special treatment of particular individual taxable incomes is 
the result of the monopolistic nature of the government in the supply of 
goods and services and is a case of price discrimination. Likewise, in 
the supply of special public servi ces, multiple pricing may or may not be 
evidence of price discriminati on, depending upon whether or not it is a 
result of the monopolistic nature of the government in the supply of these 
goods . When multiple pricing exi sts because of d i ffe r ential costs, price 
"discrimination does not exist . In fact» i n this case a single price 
would result in price discrimination . However » if multiple pricing exists 
in the supply of special public services, only as a result of the mono-
polistic nature of the government supply, t he multiple pricing does re-
sult i n price discri minati on . 
The concept of grouping s i milar speci al publ i c services together and 
using a mul tiple prici ng techni que so t hat t he total cost equals total 
revenue is based upon the monopolistic nature of the supply of public 
goods and, therefor e, consti tutes a form of price discriminat i on . 26 Us i ng 
tax pricing for special public services or attempti ng t o supply general 
25 DeMarco, The Fi r s t Pr inciples of Public Fi nance, pp . 114-115 . 
26 I bi d . , pp . 81-88 . 
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public services by usin~ a fee type pricing system also is based on the 
toonopolistic nature of government and is a form of price discrimination. 
Also, the concept of using the total budget of the government which in-
cludes both special and general public services as a basis for the supply 
of public goods would result in price discrimination. However, the total 
budget of just general public services is to be used as a basis for the 
determination of what to produce, how much to produce, and how much to 
charge. Here individual consumption is assumed to be proportional to 
individual net income and the sum of all individual net i ncomes should 
equal national income.. 
Summary 
The study of public finance has generally been centered upon the de-
termination of taxes and the effects of taxes upon economic b.ehavior in 
the private sector of the economy. Both the ability to pay theory of 
taxation and the benefit theory of taxation consider the taxing policies 
of government separately from the expenditure policies of government . 
However, the benefit theory does attempt to determine taxes based on the 
benefits that individuals do receive from the expenditure activities of 
government. 
The voluntary exchange approach to public finance extends the appli-
cation of economic analysis and economic criteria to the questions of 
what and how much the government should produce . The expenditures and 
revenues of government are considered as parts of a single process anq 
not as two separate processes . The $Overnment is accepted as a producer 
of economic goods which provid~ satisfaction to individuals just as all 
25 
other economic goods provide satisfactiono However, the political pro-
cess is also accepted as the process through which the government estab-
lishes its production policy. 
Maffeo Pantaleoni, in 1883, was one of the first economists to extend 
economic analysis to the questions of which goods should be produced and 
what quantity of these goods should be produced. Pantaleoni's approach 
; 
can be stated in terms of an equilibrium condition which is assumed to 
exist between public and private goods (MUE public goods• MUE private 
goods) • The parliament's task is to se.e that the indi vi.dual expend1. tur.es 
MUl MU2 
do not disturb the equilibrium condition (i .e., -T • -T • 
ax1 ax2 
MUE public goods) . 
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Ugo Mazzola also attempted to present a price theory approach to the 
supply of public goods . It i nvolved the concept that public goods are 
completely complementary with private goods and provide no sati sfaction 
of their own . Therefore, the allocation of resources should be based on 
W. Stanley Jevons' concept of the maximization of satisfaction where the 
problem is the distribution of a commodity in different uses. 
Emil Sax did not accept Mazzolavs concept of the complementary nature 
of a public good . Sax's formulation resembled Pantaleoni's but stressed 
the concept that government only had to approximate the equilibrium con-
ditions o This approximation could be achieved by following his equiva-
lence principle of taxation o The first approximation of this tax princi-
ple would be taxes proportional to wealth o 
Antonio DeViti DeMarco did not attempt to develop a theoretical model 
but applied price theory analysis in an explanation of the history of pub-
lie finance. In the course of thi s application, DeMarco treated many of 
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the basic problems of public finance in terms of price theory analysis. 
He accepted the.concept of a proportional income tax for all p~bli~ goods 
supplied by taxation because he believed that consumption of these goods 
was proportional to income. This was not to give an approximation of 
equilibrium, as in Sax's theory, but was an assumption about the relation-
ship between consumption (benefits) and income. 
Each approach to the voluntary exchange theory of public finance 
emphasizes different aspects. \lowever, all of the appr.oaches .hav.e in 
common the basic con·cept that price theory analysis should explain which 
goods and what quantities should be supplied by the government at various 
prices. The nongraphical models; however. do not represent t1'e clearest 
statement of the essential elements of the theory. Therefore, the next 
chapter will be devoted to the graphical presentations of the voluntary 
exchange or price theory of public finance and some of the problems and 
criticisms created by these presentations. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE OR PRICE THEORY 
OF PUBLIC FINANCE: GRAPHICAL MODELS 
The graphical models of the voluntary exchange or price theory of 
public finance represent an attempt to present the same basic concepts as 
the nongraphical modelso The use of graphical analysis does not reduce 
the need for considering the political process and does not eliminate 
all of the problems of applying price theory concepts to the supply of 
public goods o However, the graphical models provide the clearest state-
ment of the basic elements of the theory and make the nature of some of 
the problems of the theory more apparent than they were in the nongraphical 
modelso 
Erik Lindahl and Knut Wicksell 
1 In 1919, Erik Lindahl, a Swedish economist, presented a simple 
graphical model which attempted to establish the total expenditure on a 
2 public good and the relative tax shares of two classes of society o 
Class A (the relatively well-to-do) are represented by legislators A and 
1 Richard Ao Musgrave and Alan To Peacock, Classics in the Theory of 
Public Finance (London, 1958)» PP o 168-176 for an English translation of 
a chapter of Lindahl's book, Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung o 
2 No attempt is made to apply the model to the determination of what 
goods should be supplied by the government o 
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class B (the relatively poor) are represented by legislators B. It is 
assumed that there is an even distribution of political power between the 
two groups. It is also assumed that all economically related public ser-
vices are lumped together so that the total cost is the total cost of a 
group of services rather than a single service. 
Figure 1 shows the relative share of the total cost of providing a 
given public good on the abscissa. Reading from left to right, is the 
relative share of A and reading from right to left is the relative share 
of B. Various levels of total cost (V through Z) are shown along the 
ordinate on the right. The curve AR indicates the total expenditure on 
the public service at various relative cost shares to which legislators A 
would agree . Logically A legislators are willing to have a greater total 
expenditure made, if class A of society can pay a smaller percent of the 
total cost. The curve BS indicates the total expenditure on the public 
service at various relative cost shares to which legi slators B would agree . 
At X level of total expenditure, group A would agree only if group B would 
pay 65 percent of the total cost while group B would agree only if group A 
would pay 72 percent of the total cost . 
The equilibrium solution is clearl y at the intersection of the two 
curves (P) . The total expenditure to be made on the group of public ser-
vices is Y. A agrees to pay 60 percent of Y while B agrees to pay 40 per-
cent of the total cost Y. 
The fact that the Lindahl model emphasizes the political process in 
the determination of how much should be supplied and who should pay for 
the service in a manner consi stent with the political principles laid down 
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3 by Knut Wicksell has been recognized . However, a presentation of the 
4 Lindahl 100del in terms of Wicks ell's unanimity principle may be useful 
before evaluating the criticisms of the Lindahl model. 
In Figure 2, the Lindahl model is traced by the dashed curves AR and 
BS, with main bill A representing a total expenditure of V, amendment A', 
a total expenditure of W, etc. Reading the graph in terms of Wicksell's 
unanimity principle, the abscissa reading right to left measures the per-
cent of group B who would vote for various expenditure bills with various 
tax plans. Tax plan "a" favors group B while tax plan "i" favors group A. 
These tax plans can be converted into the terminology of the Lindahl 100del 
with the following schedule. 
Tax Plan A B 
a 90% of total cost 10% of total cost 
b 80% II II II 20% II II II 
C 70% II II II 30% II II II 
d 60% II II II 40% II II II 
e 50% II II II 50% II II II 
f 40% II II II 60% II II II 
g 30% II II II 70% II II II 
h 20% II II II 80% II II II 
i 10% II II II 90% II II II 
The curve DQ connecting all of the a' points i ndicates the percent of 
A legislators who would vote for the various expenditure proposals with 
tax plan "a" (i.e., class A of society to pay 90 percent of the total cost) . 
3Richard A. Musgrave, "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Publ i c Economy," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 53 (February, 1939), p . 215, and 
Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, 1959), p . 74 . 
4Musgrave and Peacock~ -PP ~ 72~118 .for an English translation of 
Wicksell's original . statement of the principle . Carl G. Uhr, Economic 
Doctrines of Knut Wicksell (Berkeley, 1960), pp o 164-180, or Ben B. 
Seligman, Main Currents in Modern Economics (New.York, 1962), pp . 559-560, 
for an interpretation of Wicksell's principle . 
Total Coo-I of· 
Pul,l;c s .. ~,,,;~., 
J( 
y 
-·. - :.....--
- ---.----
1. 
I 
I 
'f 
31 
To+a l C.os-l oi 
Public. Se. .. vic.e. 
· Main Bill A 
A .. ,. ,1..,, • .,. A" 
100 
'" 
10 70 60 6"0 l(o 3() i,O (0 
figure 2. Wicksell Model 
32 
The curve OE connecting all of the a points indicates the percent of B 
legislators who would vote for the various expenditure proposals with tax 
plan "a" (i.e., class B of society to pay 10 percent of the total cost). 
The only proposal which can obtain perfect unanimity is Amendment A''' 
with tax plan "d." In terms of the Lindahl model it is the Y level of 
total cost with class A paying 60 percent of Y and class B paying 40 per-
cent of Y. On Amendment A'' with tax plan "g," none of the B legislators 
and only 65 percent of the A legislators would vote for the proposal. On 
Amendment A'' with tax plan "c" only 15 percent of the A legislators and 
5 75 percent of the B legislators would vote for the proposal . 
Both Wicksell and Lindahl, however, recognized the practical limita-
tion that the legislature probably would never be restricted by a perfect 
unanimity rule. Therefore, Wicksell accepted the concept of approximate 
unanimity and Lindahl discussed the effects of dropping the assumption of 
equal political power. The result of either of these practical consid-
erations may be that equilibrium can be achieved in an area around point P 
depending upon which bill and tax plan approximating Amendment A9 '' with 
tax plan "d" is voted on first or which group in society has an advantage 
in political power . 
More specifically. using just the Wicksell model, the equilibrium 
level of expenditure and tax plan can be seen to depend upon the level of 
unanimity required and the order in which the proposals are voted upon . 
5 With the Wicksell-Lindahl 100del, the question of what goods should 
be supplied by the government is also determined because only t hose goods 
which are capable of receiving perfect unanimity should be supplied. 
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Assuming 100 legislators in both group A and group B, and assuming that 
the majority rule is accepted as approximate unanimity, equilibrium can 
take place for Amendment A' ' 1 ' with any tax plan, because all of the tax 
plans will get 100 percent of the vote of the B legislators and enough of 
the vote of the A legislators t o make a majority vote. Tax plans "a" or 
"b" would also be accepted as an equilibrium proposal with Amendment A''. 
With Amendment A'", any of the tax plans "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g" 
will be accepted under the majority rule concept of approximate unanimity. 
The exact combination of bill and tax plan to be accepted would depend 
6 
entirely on which one was first presented for a vote. 
According to Lindahl, if unequal political power exists, the solution 
will lie on SPR of the Lindahl model in Figure 1. BPS is the total ex-
penditure which the B legislators would desire at varying tax sharing 
plans and APR is the total expenditure which the A legislators would de-
sire at varying tax sharing plans. PS is the segment of BPS which is 
capable of obtaining perfect unanimity and PR is the segment of APR which 
is capable of obtaining perfect unanimity. Therefore, with Lindahl's 
concept of unequal political power, which is in terms of one group's 
ability to force its desires upon the other group, the solution will lie 
on PS if B has the greater political power and PR if A has the greater 
political power. However, if unequal political power is accepted as being 
6 Wicksell suggests that, in the case of approximate unanimity, all 
proposals should be voted .on and . the one .with the greatest total .vote be 
accepted . This requirement would limit the equilibrium solutions to 
Amendment A''' with tax plan "d" and Amendment A' 1 '' with any of the tax 
plans since these are the proposals which would receive a 100 percent yes 
vote . 
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any solution reached by compromise other than the optimum solution which 
can be reached with perfect unanimity, the equilibrium can be a large 
number of solutions around the point Pin Figure 2. No matter what poli-
tical conditions exist or which concept of political power is accepted, 
the combined Wicksell-Lindahl model would appear to be useful in explain-
ing the results of the political process . Equilibrium will take place 
around point Pin any case and all that would remain is to accurately 
evaluate the political process in order to determine the actual equili-
brium which will take place. 
7 In February, 1939, Richard A. Musgrave, pub l ished an article with 
an interpretation of Lindahl's roodel but Musgrave 's conclusions were the 
opposite of those arrived at in the foregoing interpretation of the 
Wicksell-Lindahl model . 
To summarize: as an interpretation of the actual expendi-
ture process, the voluntary exchange . theory was found unaccept-
able because of the unrealistic .nature of . the . voluntary exchange 
assumption in~general , and of . the competitive .pricing assumption 
in particular • . As . a solution . to . the .theory .of tax justice it 
was found strictly . dependent-.upon the . premise . of competitive 
pricing; the .. definition of t he .justice . problem employed, . more-. 
over, appeared .excessively . narrow ., .As . standards .of reference for 
analysis and appraisal of actual revenue-expenditure policies, 
the voluntary exchange model and its corollary, the8neutral re-
venue-expenditure process, were found unacceptable. 
7Musgrave, "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy," 
pp. 213-237 . 
8 Ibid ., p . 231. The consideration of the voluntary exchange theory 
as a standard of reference for analysis and the meani ng and importance of 
the neutral revenue-expenditure process is the primary concern of the 
dissertation. It is specifical l y considered in Chapters VI and VII . 
35 
Musgrave's rejection of the theory in general because of the unrealis-
tic nature of the voluntary exchange assumption is based on the fact that 
"direct compulsion prevails in the legal enforcement of individual tax 
contributions, independently of the individual 's willingness to share a 
9 part of the burden o" However, one answer to t his criticism is that the 
situation in the private economy cannot be said to be very differento In 
the private economy, an i ndividual is assumed to have a demand for any 
particular good which r elates the quantities of the good which the indi-
vidual would want to purchase to various priceso Once the individual has 
expressed his demand by making the purchasep laws of society, generally, 
protect the seller from the buyer's changing his mind. In the voluntary 
exchange model, the individual is assumed to have a similar type of de-
mand for each type of public good o The individual, however, permits his 
representative in the legislature to interpret this demand schedule. Once 
the legislator has expressed this demand by accepting a particular level 
of expenditure and tax plan, the purchase has been made. The l .aws of 
society, as in the case of the private good, protect the seller from the 
buyer's changing his mind o Once the demand is expressed by purchase or 
by the legislators' voting favorably for the providing of a product or 
service with a particular tax plan, the transaction is completed and 
laws protect the parties of the sale from changes in the individual's sub-
jective evaluation of the quantity he wants at t he price agreed upon o 
9Taxes as a form of coercion wi ll be cons i de red i n more detail in 
Chapter VL 
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The problem which Musgrave seems to have discussed under the heading 
of the compulsive nature of the political process is just the opposite of 
10 
compulsion o The problem lies in whether or not the fact that compulsion 
exists affects the individual's expressed demand. In the private economy 
it is assumed that it does noto11 In the political process, it may be 
iwre questionable, but, in the opinion of this writer, Musgrave has not 
given a sufficient reason for the rejection of the theory in general. 
Musgrave's rejection of the theory because of the competitive pricing 
assumption in particular is just a further statement of his rejection of 
the theory in general o Musgrave did not recognize the oneness of his two 
bases for the rejection of the theory. He did not consider that compulsion 
exists only after a demand is expressed and that this compulsion is not 
very dissimilar to compulsion that exists with a private good once demand 
has been expressed through a legal purchase of t he good o The effects of 
bargaining power or political power which Musgrave considers are merely 
an analysis based on an assumption that the existence of compulsion, after 
a quantity at a price has been expressed, affects the quantity which would 
be expressed o 
Musgrave's analysis, however, is primarily in terms of the individual's 
realizing that his expressed demand will affect the price o This analysis 
10rt is the opposite of compuls i on in that it revolves around the 
individual being free to express his demand without compulsion and to 
even recontract if an equilibrium solution is not determined which is 
consistent with the demand expressed ~ 
11There is little .or no literature on t he economic effects of a 
private firm .giving an absolute guarantee of satisfaction or your money 
back o 
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is based on Lindahl's statement of the model (ioeo, that one individual's 
demand curve is the other individual's supply curve)o Part of the pro-
blem, however, seems to be that Musgrave switches his analysis to the 
12 individual from the political processo In his analysis, the individual 
recognizes that his expressed demand is going to affect his cost and, 
therefore, he will not express his true demand .13 However, if it is re-
membered that the voluntary exchange model takes place in a political 
setting, at least part of Musgrave's criticism can be dropped. The indi-
vidual is not directly bargaining with another individual for the exchange 
of two goodso It is two groups of legislators attempting to obtain the 
quantity of a good, which the individuals, whom the legislator represents, 
would want at a price consistent with that quantity. The legislator does 
not have to obtain the lowest possible price for various quantities to 
satisfy the individuals he represent s o All that the legislator must ob-
tain is a quantity and price relationship which the individuals that he 
represents consider to be satisfactory. Therefore, it cannot be assumed 
that the demand curves will be affected by the fact that the price is 
affected by the demand expressed by the legislatoro Price cannot be re-
moved from its relationship to quant ity just because the good under 
12 This criticism of Musgrave 9s analysis is of particular importance 
when Musgrave considers . the . effects of large numbers o If the model is re-
stricted to the political mechanism~ the problem of . large number s does not 
exist in the form stated by .Musgrave o The voting on speci fic expenditure-
tax proposals is .done by a limited .number of legislators representing tax-
payer consumers and not by the taxpayer consumers themselves o The problem 
of the legislator representing a l arge number of taxpayer consumers is a 
different problem and is treated i n Chapter VIIo 
13 The theoretical aspect s of t he problem of unr evealed preferences 
are dis cussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
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consideration is a public good . If the legislator is attempting to maxi-
mize the satisfaction o.f those i ndividuals whom he represents, ,he must 
express a demand which relates quantity and price and it must be a quan-
tity and price relationship indicated by the demand curve in the Lindahl 
model because this curve by definition is the schedule of quantities which 
the individuals would want at various prices . To express any other quan-
tity-price relationship would put the legislator in the position of not 
truly representing the individuals that put hi m in office . This situation 
may well exist but t his is not the question . In other words, Musgrave ' s 
criticism although stated in terms of a theoretical criticism is more akin 
to a practical criticism that politicians do not perfectly represent those 
14 
who put them in office. 
Musgrave , in 1959, reconsidered his rejection of the voluntary ex-
15 
change model and came up with the same conclusions . This time, however, 
his analysis was more specifically in terms of a Cournot duopoly situation . 
This analysis can be rejected simply because each individual is not a pro-
ducer trying to obtain a favorable price for the goods he has to sell . 
The comments about Musgrave 9s earlier rejection of the theory still apply 
but it may be good to consider further what the Cournot duopoly analysis 
would imply . An analogy can be made for this purpose . In the private 
economy 9 it would have to be assumed that a stockholder of a large company 
14The theoretical issue involved . in the problem is whether or not 
individuals do consi der public goods in terms of a quantity and price re-
lationship which maximizes satisfaction and which . they expect their legis-
lators to abide by . This i ssue is t aken up ·in Chapter IV . 
15 Musgrave, The Theory of Public Fi nance, pp . 78-80 . 
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tries to get management to set its price so that the stockholder acting 
as a consumer can purchase a larger quantity of the good produced by the 
firm o The stockholder and consumer may be one person but this does not 
mean that as a stockholder, the individual tries to bargain with other 
individuals (stockholder s) just because by so doing he can affect the 
price he has to pay for the good as a consumero In the public economy» 
the individual is a voter and a consumero This fact, however, does not 
mean that the individual as a voter will bar gain with other voters to 
affect the price he has to pay for the good as a consumero The only con-
cern of the individual is that he can purchase a quantity of the good at 
a price which maximizes his satisfaction. In the case of a private good, 
this is accomplished by merely seeing to it that the quantity he pur-
chases has a particular relationship to the price determined by the mar-
ket or by the management o In the case of the publi c good» this is accom-
plished by seeing to it that the l egislator who represents the i ndivi -
dual expresses a quantity and price relationship that maximi zes the in-
dividual' s satisfactiono 
Under the consideration of the voluntary exchange theory as a 
solution to the theory of tax justice» Musgrave rejects the theory because 
of the noncompeti tive nature of the political process and because of 
the assumption that original distribution of wealth is assumed to be a 
"just" distribution o The former cause for rejection of t he voluntary 
exchange theory has been discussed and only accepted as a practical 
limitation to the extent that politicians do not and need not abide by 
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the desire$ of the individuals whom they represent. The latter cause for 
16 
rejection is muc.h mo.re complex and will no.t be treated here. 
Howard ao Bowen 
In 1943, Howard R. Bowen17 presented another formulation of the vol-
untary exchange or price theory of public finance which was in terms of 
an individual voting process rather than a political voting process and 
which was presented more along the lines of accepted price theory analysis. 
Figure 3 presents the determination of the ideal output and cost 
distribution in terms of real goods. The vertical axis measures the 
quantity of all other goods which the individuals would be willing to 
give up to obtain social goods and the horizontal axis measures the quan-
tity of the social good desired . The i ndividual curves of marginal 
substitution are individual demand curves with prices stated in terms of 
the quantity of all other goods that individual is willing to give up 
16 The nature of the state and the concept of the nature of man are 
important factors in the question of tax justice but will not be discussed 
here. For one interpretation of the effect of the . concept of the nature 
of the state on the acceptance or nonacceptance of the voluntary exchange 
theory see: James M. Buchananj "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: 
A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, Volume 57 (December, 
1949), pp . 496-505. 
17 Howard R. Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation 
of Economic Resources," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume LVII 
(November, 1943), pp. 27-48 . 
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18 to obtain various quantities of social goods . The TMS curve is the 
total demand curve. Because social goods are defined as those goods for 
19 
which the demand (supply) cannot be individually held, the total demand 
curve is obtained by vertically adding the individual demand curves (MS 
a 
and MSb) rather than by horizontally adding them. The intersection of 
the marginal cost curve (MC) 20 and the total demand curve at point Pde-
termines the "ideal" output. The individual cost shares are determined 
by the intersection of the vertical line at the "ideal" output and the 
individual demand curves . 21 
Bowen also shows that the average total demand (TMS/N) and average 
marginal cost (MC/N) would determine the same "ideal" output (P). The 
slope of the TMS curve and TMS/N curve would not be the same but the 
18 Bowen's use of marginal substitution curves instead of regularly 
defined demand curves is regretable because it may have contributed to 
the later use of indifference .. curves '° The adoption of indifference curves 
by Samuelson and Musgrave has led to considerable confusion and a con-
tinued rejection of the theory. The problems developing from Musgrave's 
analysis are treated at length in Chapter IV . 
19 Bowen speaks of divisibility of demand but yet speaks of social 
goods not being divisible into units that can be the unique possession 
of individuals. The possession of individuals refers to the consumption 
of a supply of goods so that it is actually the indivisibility of supply 
rather than demand . 
20 Bowen uses the concept that the ideal output exists when MC equals 
demand if the product has constant or decreasing costs but when AC equals 
demand if the product has increasing costs . Bowen explains the metho-
dology in the latter ~ase as well as the first two cases but no attempt 
is made to present the AC determination since MC determination is still 
the more widely held concept . 
21 Individual cost shares can only be <letermined in this mannerj if 
i t is a constant cost product because in the other cases the revenue 
would not equal the total cost . 
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point of intersection would be the same because at this point TMS equals 
MC and equal numbers divided by the same number are equal. The impor-
tance of this concept can be seen in Figure 4 where Bowen assumes that 
the individual demand curves will fall into a normal pattern of distri-
bution . Assuming a normal distribution, the average equals the mode. 
Therefore, the modal demand curve is the same as the average demand curve 
and its use results in the determination of the same "ideal" output as 
the use of the total demand curve. 
The assumption of the normal distributi on is also important in the 
interpretation of the voting process made by Bowen becausej if each in-
dividual votes on the quantity of the service he would desire, the "ideal" 
output is both the output which gets exactly one-half of the votes and 
which gets more votes than any other quantity . In the case of voting on 
various increments or decrements to a given quantity of a social good, 
the 11ideal" output is the one which gets exactly one-half of the votes 
yes and one-half no. Smaller quantities will receive a greater number 
of yes votes than the "i deal" output . 
Three assumptions which are explicitly made by Bowen and which were 
implicit in the presentation, are important: (1) The income distribution 
is "correct" (i.e., the income distribution has been accepted by society 
and that it is the same necessary assumption in order to use price theory 
of private goods for a policy recommendation), (2) The product will be 
available equally to all individuals so that the differences in demand 
represent differences in tastes and preferences rather than just differ-
ences in benefits (a normal curve of distribution cannot be assumed if 
• 
benefits are different to each individual voter)~ and (3) The cost of 
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producing the product in various quantities is known to the voters and 
will be divided equally between the voters . This means that the voter 
automatically knows his cost (AC/N). In other words, the voter knows 
his relative share of the total expenditure on the social good. 
Modification of the second and third assumptions can be accomplished 
if the assumption is made that those receiving different benefits can be 
grouped into classes which do receive the same benefit22 and that the 
costs will be distributed according to the modal demand for each class 
but that the individual and classes of individuals are not affected in 
their expressed demand by the fact that t heir demand affects their own 
relative cost share. Figure 5 presents Bowen's mode1. 23 
The relationship between the Lindahl model and the Bowen model is 
both interesting and important . Figure 6 presents another Bowen model 
like Figure 3 and another Lindahl model like Figure 1 . The curves of 
the Lindahl model have been determined by the curves in the Bowen model. 
The total expenditure is computed by multiplying the quantity by the 
average cost (AC) . The percent of the total expenditure which each in-
dividual is willing to pay is computed by dividing the individual 's de-
mand by the total cost at each possible output. The output determined 
by both models is the same. The assumption that average cost is constant 
22 An example can be made of education where one class .of people have 
no children and the other classes can be listed by the number of children 
per family . ,Under these conditions, each class i fication of people can 
be assumed to have the same benefi t and, therefore, it can reasonably be 
assumed that within each. classification, tastes and preferences will 
vary in accordance with a normal distribution . 
23Bowen's mode l does not dete rmine t he tax-price. It is given by 
the MC/N curve assumed for each class. 
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is essential to the reconciliation of the two models because the equili-
brium of the Lindahl model will occur at the output determined by the 
intersections of average cost and the total demand curve in the Bowen 
model. Another assumption which is necessary in the reconciliation of 
the two models is that the AR and BS curves of Figure 1 must be taken as 
demand curves of two individuals rather than of two groups of legislators, 
This is the interpretation of the Lindahl model used by Musgrave but it 
ignores Lindahl's consideration of output being determined in parliament. 
If the Lindahl model is interpreted to be two groups of legislators re-
presenting two classes of individuals in society. it would be necessary 
to assume that all individuals in each class have the same demand function 
or that all individual demands are vertically added and the individual 
cost shares are determined by the modal or average demand of the parti-
cular classes of society. The modal curves as developed by Bowen in 
Figure 5 cannot be used to reconcile the two models because Bowen has 
started with a given per unit cost for each class of society. To look 
at it another way, the reconciliation requires two assumptions: (1) The 
individual demand curves are not affected by the fact that the expressed 
demand affects the relative cost shares of the individuals, and (2) The 
legislators have perfectly measured the total demand function of all 
individuals of society or the modal demand function of the individuals 
which the particular group of legislators represent . 
Bowen's article also brings to light several other points of interest 
to the price theory of public finance . One point relates to the quanti-
tative measurement of social goods . Bowen makes the point that some 
social goods like education cannot be measured in simple physical units 
49 
of volume, time, or weight. Education consists of buildings, equipment, 
24 
number of teachers, quality of teachers, etc. Each of these components 
of education can be measured as separate goods and the theory applied to 
each . This, however, would only be realistic for a large item like 
buildings. However, to Bowen, this does not rule out the use of the 
theory for education as a whole . Quantity can be measured by total ex-
penditures on education if it is assumed that the voters have knowledge 
25 
of an existing list of priorities . In other words, if the voters know 
or beforehand establish the order in whi ch expenditures will be made on 
the component parts of education, the quantity of education can be mea-
sured in terms of the total expenditure to be made on education. 
These considerations of education made by Bowen point out the pro-
blem of not carrying out the concept of t he price theory of public finance 
to its logical conclusions . Buildings, teachers, equipment, etc. are re-
sources used to produce a product, education. The allocation of these 
resources should be based upon the least cost distribution of resources 
and not the demand of individuals. Education must be measured in terms 
of levels of knowledge attained . In other words, the quantity of educa-
tion which individuals compare with their cost in attempting to maximize 
24Lindahl's concept of voting on all economically related goods at 
one time may be interpreted to mean the same thing or it may be taken 
to mean goods related by tastes and preferences . In either case, 
Musgrave 1 s criticisms of Lindahl, based on the concept that all goods 
which are capable of being determined by the benefit principle are 
lumped together in one vote, are not valid . 
25The concept of and the importance of establishing a list of priori-
ties in expenditures was developed in the discussion of Emil Sax's volun-
tary exchange theory in Chapter II . 
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their satisfaction is a quantity in terms of the level of education 
(eighth grade, high school, college degree, etc.) which individuals want 
the government to supply. It is clear that levels of education and levels 
of knowledge are not the same thing even if the function of education is 
to provide knowledge, but it is reasonable to assume that individuals do 
measure education in terms of levels of education in our society. 
Another important concept discussed by Bowen is the alternatives to 
voting. Recognizing that the individual voting process is not practical 
for any unit of government larger than that which can operate on a town 
meeting basis, Bowen suggests the use of polls of random samples of 
society by public officials. "If a poll is based on a representative 
sample of the population and if the questions are put in the same way as 
if the entire citizenry were voting, the results could be interpreted in 
exactly the same way [as the vote of all the people]. 1126 Bowen is quick 
to add that it would be necessary that those polled would have to be 
well informed on the issue and be responsible citizens with a knowledge 
that their choices will influence policy. These two conditions might be 
difficult to meet and still have a representative sample of the entire 
voting public but it is a start in the direction of finding a means by 
which the political ·process (that in all modern societies must make the 
26 Bowen, p. 43. 
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ultimate decision as to what and how much of social goods are to be pro-
duced by the government) can ascertain the individual demands for social 
27 goods. 
Milton z. Kafoglis 
In 1962, Milton z. Kafoglis 28 added to the stock of theoretical 
models29 which were related back to the original Lindahl modet. 30 
Kafoglis's formulation makes use of a derivation of net demand curves 
for each individual based on the individual's recognition that the con-
sumption of the social goods by other individuals gives him a "windfall" 
of satisfaction. 
27 The function of pressure groups in the modern democratic state may 
be somewhat similar to the process of polling a segment of the economy, 
if certain assumptions are made about the naturt of the pressu£e groups 
and the extent of influence which t he pressure groups have in the politi-
cal process . More will be said about pressure groups in Chapter V. 
28 Milton z. Kafoglis, Welfare Economics and Subsi dy Programs (Gaines-
ville, Florida). 
29 James M. Buchanan, "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A 
Suggested Approach, 11 Journal .£!. Political .Ecot1omy, Volume 57 (December, 
1949), p. 496; Paul Samuelson!> "Diagramatic Exposition of A 'i'heory of 
Public Expenditures, 11 Review .Q!. Economics and Statisth.s , V_olume 37 
(November, . 1955), .p. 350; and Charles M. Tiebout 9 11A Pure. Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 11 Journal .Qf PoliticaL Economy~ Volume 64 (October, 1956) 9 
p . 416, are examples of . other theoretical. frameworks presented . in recent 
years . The Samuelson .modeLwas , used .. as a .criticism of the .voluntary ex-
change approach to public finance and is r eviewed in Chapter IV to the 
extent that Richard Musgrave used the model as a means of present i ng a 
comprehensive review · and criticism of the theory . 
30 Related to the Lindahl mode l if the Lindahl model is interpreted 
as a xoodel of individual equilibrium rather than as a nx,del of political 
equilibrium . 
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Kafoglis relates his net demand curve model to the concept of "cost 
of service pricing" and the Bowen vertical summation of demand curv.e 
mode131 to the concept of "value of service pricing. 1132 To Kafoglis, the 
"cost of service" concept involves a hor:Lzontal summation of adjusted 
(net) demand curves to arrive at the collective demand. The per unit 
tax-price paid is the same to all indiv'iduals as in the case of private 
goods without price discrimination. The taxpayer consumer adjusts his 
consumption according to his adjusted (net) demand curve. The "value of 
service" concept using a vertical summation of demand curves results in 
different per unit tax-prices being paid by dif ferent individuals but 
with all individuals consuming the same units of production. The total 
cost to each individual and total production is shown by Kafoglis to be 
33 the same in either case . Therefore, it follows that the net demand 
curve analysis can be applied where the social good involves joint satis-
faction but individual consumption while the vertical summation of de-
mand curve analysis must be applied where the social good has joint con-
sumption. 
31Kafoglis puts the Bowen mode l in terms of ordinary demand curves 
rather than marginal substitution curves . 
32 Edwin R. A. Seligman, Studies . in Public .. Finance (New York, 1925) j 
pp . 182-190 set forth the distinction between "cost of service pricing" 
and ''value of service pricing . " Seligman related t he former to the 
protection theory of taxation and t he latter to the benef i t theory of 
taxation. 
33 Kafoglis's proof of this point is based on the constant margi nal 
cost model of Bowen and a simplified version of the net demand curve 
derived in detail later on . 
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The derivation of the net demand curves makes use of indifference 
curve analysis and income consumption lines which are a familiar part of 
accepted price theory analysis. Figure 7 presents the indifference maps 
of two individuals, A and B. The process of adjustment can be made by 
starting with either individual seeking equilibrium without the knowledge 
that the consumption of the other indivi dua l will affect the satisfaction 
derived from any given quantity of the social good consumed by the first 
individual or by starting with both in an equilibrium position before the 
recognition of "windfall" satisfaction . 
Assuming E is the original equilibrium combination for A with in-
o 
come level LL and e for B with income level 11, the first step of ad-
o 
justment takes place when A realizes that he has derived satisfaction 
from the quantity q purchased by Bas well as the satisfaction derived 
from his own purchase of Q quantity of the social good . This additional 
satisfaction experienced by A results i n a lowering of A's marginal rate 
of substitution for the social good . Graphically this can be presented 
by indicating the level of sati sfac t ion received by A (S = Q + q) . At 
this marginal rate of substitution A would want R combination of goods 
if he had r 1 income . Since he does not have t his l evel of income , A will 
adjust his purchases to combination T and take Q_2 quantity of the social 
good instead of quant i ty Q. Individual B then recognizes that he re-
ceived satisfaction from A' s purchase of quantity Q2 of the social good . 
Therefore, B's marginal rate of substitution for the social good is re-
duced as shown by position S . Given B' s income level 11, he will r educe 
his purchases of the social good t o q2 from q . This change , howeverp 
affects the satisfact i on of A s i nce A's purchases we re based on B' s 
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consumption of quantity q of the social good. A's marginal rate of sub-
stitution for social goods has been increased by B's action. Therefore, 
A must increase his consumption of the social good to U in order to 
reach an equilibrium consistent with B's purchase of q2 quantity of the 
social good. This action, however, alters the satisfaction obtained by 
B. B must, therefore, make another adjustment. 
The result of the adjustment process is the establishment of an 
equilibrium at Ef for A and ef for B. The level of satisfaction for B 
is rf which is the satisfaction from Qf and qf consistent with B's origi-
nal income consumption curve. 
The starting income level can be changed and the process repeated. 
Figure 7 for individual A indicates points Hand G which are equilibrium 
combinations starting with a lower and a higher income than I. These 
equilibrium positions are carried over to Figure 8 where a "Net Income 
Consumption" curve is indicated. The net curve reflects a change in the 
indifference map resulting from the recognition of joint satisfaction on 
the part of individual A. Based on the net income consumption curve, a 
demand schedule can be established which also takes into consideration 
the joint satisfaction derived from the social good . Again assuming I 
level of income for A, the price of the social good can be varied (P3, 
P1 and P2) . The quantities Qh' Qf and Qj are determined . These price 
and quantity relationships are a part of A's net demand schedule (DNA); 
ef is an equilibrium combination for individual B. The balance of B's 
net demand curve (DNB) can be derived in the same manner as A's . The 
two curves can then be horizontally summed to determine the "Net Collec-
tive Demand" (CDN) . Assuming a constant cost social good, with AC and 
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MC equal to P1 , the total output would be Q and both A and B would pay P1 • 
A would take Qf and B would take qf . 
Kafoglis's formulation is of particular importance because it points 
out the distinction and importance of the two types of external economies 
of consumption; joint satisfaction and joint consumption. The Lindahl 
and Bowen models involve goods which have the characteristic of joint 
consumption. The Kafoglis model involves a good which has the character-
istic of joint satisfaction. The methodology used in analysis must be 
consistent with the particular characteristic of the public good which 
gives rise to the situation where external economies of consumption do 
exist. This also implies that when a particular methodology is used, 
the good in the analysis could be discussed in terms of the characteris-
tic with which the methodology is consistent . 
Sunmary 
The graphical model of Erik Lindahl is probably the best known vol-
untary exchange approach model in the United States . However, Richard A. 
Musgrave's criticisms appear to be accepted as valid by many economists. 
The analysis of these criticisms was made after showing the relationship 
between Lindahl ' s model and Knut Wicksell's unanimity principle o The 
conclus i ons of the analysis were that the criti cisms are not entire l y 
valid o Some of the criticisms are completely rejected as being the re-
sult of a misinterpretati on of the Lindahl model . Other of the criti-
cisms do point up problems of the Lindahl model which have not been fully 
answered but the criticisms do not appear to be a justification for the 
complete rejection of the price theory of public finance. 
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The Howard R. Bowen model is another formulation of the voluntary 
exchange approach. It more closely follows the generally accepted tools 
of price theory analysis. However, the most important aspect of Bowen's 
presentation is his emphasis on the voting mechanism. The voting is by 
individuals and not by representatives of individuals as in the Lindahl 
model. With this emphasis on the individual voting process, Bowen is 
able to bring out many of the assumptions which are necessary to obtain 
an optimum allocation of resources. He also brings up the issue of an 
optimum allocation when the government is assumed to be based on repre-
sentatives of individuals determining the output and taxes . Important 
in this context is Bowen's concept of using random sample polls for 
ascertaining the desires of individuals . 
The most recent model following the general framework of the price 
theory of public finance is that of Milton z. Kafoglis. He deals with 
goods which provide joint satisfaction rather than goods which provide 
joint consumption as used by Bowen . The model attempts to show how the 
income consumption curve can be used to determine the adjustment in in-
difference curves which must be taken into account to arrive at the 
optimum allocation of resources . The important point, however, is that 
Kafoglis has made a clear distinction between different types of public 
goods and shown the difference that the type of good makes i n the metho-
dology used to analyze them. 
The criticisms concerning revealed preferences have generally been 
directed at models which involve a good with the characteristic of joint 
consumption . The nex t chapter wi ll at t empt to evaluate the most basic 
criticisms raised concerning the revealing of preferences when the public 
59 
good is one with the characteristic of joint consumptiono The question 
of whether or not goods with this characteristic are important in the real 
world is not consideredo The definition of a public good is accepted in 
the ~nalysis of the criticism so that it can be de.termined whether or not a 
good with the characteristic of joint consumption does cause different 
conclusions to be derived from the analysis. 
CHAPTER IV 
A CRITIQUE OF CRITICISMS: REVEALED PREFERENCES 
There are two basic criticisms of the voluntary exchange theory of 
public finance involving revealed preferences o The first criticism is 
that the individual will not reveal his true preferences for public goods. 
The second criticism is that even if the individual did reveal his true 
preferences for a public good, there is no single solution to the pro-
blem of allocating resources analogous to that found in the allocation 
of resources to private goodso Both criticisms have been raised by 
Richard A. Musgrave and have apparently been accepted by many economistso 
In fact, although Musgrave was one of the first to bring the vqluntary 
exchange or price theory of public finance to the attention of American 
economists, he was also one of its strongest critics and has led the way 
1 to the rejection of the theory. 
The first criticism was raised by Musgrave in relation to Lindahl's 
modelo The criticism as relates specifically to the Lindahl model was 
treated in Chapter IIIo The criticism, however, may be taken as a more 
general criticism about the applicability of the price theory of public 
finance to the problem of allocating resources to any good which has the 
1Richard Ao Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, 1959), 
and "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Finance," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Volume 53 (February, 1938) . 
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characteristic of joint consumption . Therefore, the first section of 
this chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the criticism as it 
applies to the allocation of resources without reference to any particular 
formulation of the price theory of public finance. 
The second criticism is raised by Musgrave in relation to the appli-
cability of the theory in a general equilibrium framework. Therefore, 
the general equilibrium model which was adopted by Musgrave to state the 
criticism is presented in the second section .of this chapter. The model 
is also applied to two private goods in order to determine whether it is 
the allocation of resources to a public good with joint consumption which 
is not analogous to the allocation of resources to private goods or 
whether it is the model used in the Musgrave analysis which is not 
analogous to the theory of the allocation of resources to private goods . 
Preferences Will Not Be Revealed 
The .question of whether or not preferences will be revealed by indi-
viduals for a public good through the political process is both a prac-
tical consideration and a theoretical consideration . The theoretical 
issue is whether or not there is something inherent in the nature of 
public goods or in the supply of and demand for public goods which makes, 
it necessary or likely that the individual acting rationally would not 
reveal his preferences for the public goods. One situation that might 
lead to such a conclusion is one in. which an individual can derive satis-
faction from the supply of a public good without having to express a 
desire for the good and without having to pay for the good according to 
his actual individual satisfaction . Musgrave's attempt to illustrate a 
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situation of this type is based on two propositions: (1) an equal quantity 
of public goods and services is consumed by all taxpayer-buyers; (2) an 
individual taxpayer's demand exerts no influence over the quantity of pub-
2 lie goods supplied . 
The first proposition involves a problem of defining a public good 
in terms of its characteristics. The public good is said to be a good 
which has the characteristic that each individual receives benefits from 
the entire supply as if he were the only individual consuming it (i.e., 
joint consumption). The equal consumption definition of a public good 
is accepted as a polar case which is possible even if it may not exist 
3 for many goods. The issue is whether or not a ' good which does fit this 
definition is likely to be the cause of individuals not revealing their 
preferences for the good. 
Figure 9 presents one possible formulation of the process through 
which preferences might be revealed even when the equal consumption de-
finition of a public good is accepted and when each individual pays 
4 
according to his revealed preferences. There are two taxpayers A and B. 
If taxpayers A and B reveal their true preference, a vertical summation 
~us grave, The Theory of Public Finance . 
3 A great deal of discussion was created, in reference to whether or 
not the equal consumption definition for a public good had any application 
in the real world, after Samuelson used it in his model as a polar case " 
Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagramatic Exposition of A Theory of Public Expendi-
ture," Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 37 (November, 1955) . 
4 Ansel M. Sharp and Donald R. Escarraz, "A Reconsideration of the 
Price or Exchange Theory of Public Finance," to be puJ,lished in the 
October, 1964 issue of The Southern Economic Journal. 
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of their individual demands (aa and bb) would be designated by DD. The 
optimum amount of public good X, then, is Oq and the optimum distribution 
of the costs of producing good Xis 0Pa • Oq for taxpayer A and OPb • Oq 
for taxpayer B. Assume that taxpayer A reveals his true preferences and 
that taxpayer B does not reveal his preferences. The collective demand 
is only A's demand (aa) and only Oq 1 of good X will be made available for 
equal consumption. Taxpayer A is in equilibrium but taxpayer Bis not. 
If B's tax share is zero, as it would be if B does not reveal any pre-
ference for X, B really desires Oq 2 of X at the existing zero price in-
stead of the quantity Oq 1 which will be made available. Therefore, tax-
payer B may have an inclination to reveal, at least, some of his preferences. 
If B reveals part of his preferences, his tax share of the Oq1 of X rises 
above zero and A's tax share declines. At the lower price to A (OP - B's 
price), A demands a greater quantity of X. The process, followed to its 
logical conclusions, results in a situation where both A and B do reveal 
their true preferences. 
Musgrave's second proposition involves the ques tion of the effect 
that having a large number of individuals participate in the determina-
tion of what quantity should be produced will have upon a single indi-
vidual revealing his preferences . In Chapter III, Musgrave's analysis 
was rejected. The rejection was not due to the use of small numbers in 
the analysis. The rejection of the duopoly type of analysis was due to 
the assumption that the individual bargained with other individuals as if 
he were a producer attempting to maximize his profi t s . The individual 
who has preferences for goods is a consumer and not a producer . There-
fore, the analysis must be based upon the i ndividual attempting to 
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maximize his satisfactiono In such an analysis, it is necessary to 
assume that the individual does have preferences in regard to public goods 
or that he does receive satisfaction from public goods in relation to 
the quantities he consumeso The latter will be assumed in the analysis 
which follows so that simple mathematical expression of the assumption of 
maximization of satisfaction in terms of marginal utilities may be used. 5 
If the individual derives satisfaction from each public good as he 
does from each private good, the maximization of satisfaction would be 
expressed exactly the same for both private and public goods 
MU MU 
.... r. p z). The goods represented by a and b can be 
y z 
taken as public goods such as national defense and education and the goods 
represented by y and z can be taken as private goods such as automobiles 
and fountain pens. 
Given this type of maximization of satisfaction criterion, it would 
be impossible for the individual to maximize his satisfaction if one of 
the goods has equal consumption and if at the same time everybody must 
pay the same price o The tax price and the quantity supplied cannot both 
be the same for all individuals unless it is assumed that all individuals 
have identical utility functions for the good o Therefore, the individual 
under these conditions would have no reason to reveal his preferences for 
the public good . 
5The acceptance of indifference curve analysis and relative dimin-
ishing marginal utility between two goods instead of marginal utility 
analysis and absolute diminishing marginal ut i lity for all goods does 
not effect the conclusions about revealed preferences which follow. 
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However, if the tax price is permitted to vary between individuals 
and if it is determined by the tastes and preferences of the individual 
(i.e., in accordance with the benefit theory of taxation), he can maximize 
his satisfaction. The fact that one of the goods has equal consumption 
does not interfere with the individual's ability to maximize his satis-
faction. In fact, the quantity of the public good which is supplied does 
not have to be based upon the tastes and preferences of individuals just 
so long as the individual's tax price is determined by the individual's 
6 preferences for the given quantity. Therefore, the individual under 
these conditions would have a motivation to reveal his preferences for 
the public good. 
The fact that a large number of individuals might be involved is 
only significant under the foregoing analysis as a practical considera-
tion. The individual maximizing his satisfaction is not affected by the 
number of other individuals attempting to maximize their satisfaction 
except as the number of individuals affects the government's ability to 
7 base the tax price on the individual ' s tastes and preferences. 
Another practical consideration, however, should be made at this 
point. The above analysis assumed that the individual knows his tax 
6 The fact that the quantity of the public good is not based upon 
the tastes and preferences of individuals does affect the allocation of 
resources but it does not affect the individual's ability to maximize his 
satisfaction or his m:>tivation to reveal his preferences. More is said 
about the effect of this type of situation on the allocation of resources 
in Chapter VI . 
7 The effect of various types of organizations upon the applicability 
of the voluntary exchange or pri ce theory of publi c finance is treated in 
Chapter V. 
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price will be based upon his tastes and preferences for each public good. 
If it is assumed that the individual accepts the total of government 
activity as one public good, it would not be necessary to assume that the 
tax price is based upon the individual's tastes and preferences for each 
' 8 good supplied by the government . Th~ maximization of satisfaction cri-
MUG MU MU 
ter ion becomes T • ovo. __z . --1. In this case, G represents all p p • 
G y z 
government activity and TG represents the individual's total tax bilL 
The allocation of resources to particul ar public goods such as national 
defense, highways, education, etc . would have to be based upon the least 
cost combination of these goods in providing various quantities of the 
good; total government activity . 
Given this type of maximization of satis f action cri terion, it would 
be possible for the i ndividual to maximize his satisfaction . This follows 
even if the good, total government activity, is assumed to have the 
characteristic of equal consumpt i on and if the tax price is not based 
upon the individual's t astes and pr eferences . In this case, the indivi-
MUG 
dual's ~- is deter mined i ndependent of the tastes and preferences of 
TG 
the individual . The indi vi dual maximizes hi s sati sfaction by adjusting 
8 DeMarco states a bel i ef that as the practice of special assessment 
decreased, "the taxpayer , i n making up hi s own budget no longer compares 
every special assessment wi th the consumpt ion of the corresponding service 
but compares the whole of his taxes with t he whole of the services he con-
sumes . " Antonio De Viti DeMarco, Firs t Pr i nciples of Public Finance, trans . 
Edith P . Marget (London, 1936) , p . 110 . 
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9 his private consumptiono Preferences for public goods are revealed but 
the revealing process must be done through the adjustment of private 
10 
consumption. 
However, if the government does attempt to base the tax price upon 
individual tastes and preferences, the individual will be able to maximize 
his satisfaction by adjusting his tax price as an alternative to adjusting 
his private consumption. Therefore, the individual may have a motivation 
to reveal his preferences for total government activity through the poli-
tical process o 
In either case, preferences are revealed. In the one case, the 
assumption about the nature of the political process makes it necessary 
for the individual to reveal his preferences through his behavior in the 
market processo If the political process is capable of basing taxes 
upon individual tastes and preferences, the individual has a motivation 
to reveal his preferences for the public good i n the political process . 
9In accepted price theory of private goods the adjustment takes place 
solely as a result of the decreased income available for private consump-
tiono In the above formulation of the price theory of public goods, in-
come available for private consumption is reduced by the same .process but 
the individual's adjustment of private consumption is restricted sti ll 
further by the necessity of making his marginal utility per dollar's worth 
of spending for each private good equal to the ar b i trarily determined 
marginal utility per dollar's worth of spending for public goods o 
lOTiebout presents still another means of revealing preferences when 
he concludes from his analysis that preferences for local government 
services are expressed by individuals through thei r choice of suburban 
community around the lar ge cities in our modern society o Charles Mo 
Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure," J ournal of Political 
Economy, Volume 64 (October, 1956) 0 ~ 
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A Large Number of Solutions Exist When Preferences are Revealed 
Assuming true preferences are revealed, Musgrave contends that there 
is still another flaw in the price theory mode 1. "Even if all preferences 
are revealed, there is no single best solution analogous to the Pareto 
optimum in the satisfaction of purely private wants. Instead we are 
confronted with large number of solutions, all of which are optimal in 
11 the Pareto sense." 
The equilibrium model used by Musgrave to derive these conclusions 
12 is based upon a model developed by Samuelson. Figure 10 is a reproduc-
tion of the Musgrave version of this model. The first diagram is the 
familiar transformation curve and the next two diagrams are indifference 
maps of individuals A and B. OC and OD are said to represent the distri-
bution of income between A and B since OC and OD are the quantities of 
private goods they could hold if they held only private goods with their 
income. Individual A is arbitrarily moved along his indifference curve 
i 1 , which contains combination OC of private goods . Given the trans-
formation curve's production limits, this process limits individual B to 
a specific combination of social and private goods for each point on 
individual A's indifference curve . Curve MD, therefore, represents the 
various combinations of public and private goods available to individual 
Bas individual A is arbitrarily moved along his indifference curve i 1 • 
Point Wis the point of tangency wi th the highest possible indifference 
11 Musgrave, The Theory of Public Fi nance, p . 84 . 
12 Ibid . , p . 81, see footnote . 
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curve and determines the quan tities OG of public goods and OK of private 
goods which individual B would desire without individual A being worse 
off than if he held all of his income as private goodso The same process 
is then followed for individual A by moving individual B along his in-
difference curve i 1 o Curve NC is then developed and quantities OJ of 
public goods and OQ of private goods are found to be the combination in-
dividual A would desire without making individual B worse off than if he 
13 held all of his income in private goods . 
The Pareto optima developed in the foregoing analysis are presented 
on a utility frontier (Figure ll) o Point X represents the ordinal mea-
surement of satisfaction for individuals A and B when individual A has 
the combination P and individual B has the combination T of public and 
private goods o Point Y represents the ordinal measurement of satisfaction 
when individual A has the combination V and individual B has the combina-
tion W of public and private goods o The ot her points on the utility 
frontier could be developed by varying the original distribution of in-
come so that either or both individuals are on a di fferent indifference 
curve at the start of the analysis. The conclusion drawn from the analy-
sis is that "the area ZYX in Figure 11 shows the infinite number of 
13 Musgrave assumes the distribution of income is given and does not 
change but this is i ncompati b le with the methodology used . If we con-
sider it a general equil i brium view with only two goods and two indivi -
duals, the distribution of the physical uni t s represents the income dis-
tribution . Figure B shows that the one solution resulted in individual 
A holding OQ of the private good and individual B holding OR of the pri-
vate good and the two holding OJ of the publi c good o The other solution 
gave i ndividual A, OS of the private good and indi vi dual BOK of t he 
private good and both individuals had OG of the public good . It~ there-
fore, does not appear to be correct t o say that t he distribution of in-
come remains OC/OE for individual A and OD / OE for i ndividual Bo 
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possible solutions that leave A, B or both, better off than at Z, where 
no public services are supp lied. 1114 
The above review of the methodology used by Musgrave raises the 
question of whether the arbitrary movement of one individual along an 
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indifference curve, to determine what combination of goods a second indi-
vidual would like to hold, is compatible with price theory analysis. 
The "Edgeworth box analysis" of exchange makes use of this method to es-
tablish a contract curve which contains an infinite number of Paretian 
optima. In other words, it establishes those changes in social variables 
which can take place through "trading. 1115 
Trading, however, is not the object of the voluntary payments model, 
The voluntary exchange approach must be based upon a money economy and 
not a barter economy. The Musgrave analysis tells us nothing more than 
what the "Edgeworth box analysis" tel l s. In other words, it is the bar-
ter nature of the analysis (i .e . , the arbitrary holding of one individual 
on a given indifference curve while permitting the other to choose the 
combination of goods which maximizes his satisfaction) which causes the 
existence of an infinite number of Pareto optima points. 
Figure 12 presents the Musgrave analysis using the private good 
definition for both goods. The change in definition does cause a basic 
change in the procedure . This is that the placing of individual A at a 
point on his indifference curve leaves a line of attainable combinations 
14 Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, pp . 83-84 . 
15 Kenneth E. Boulding, "Welfare Economics," A Survey of Contemporary 
Economics , II, editor, B. F. Haley (Homewoodp 1952) 1 pp . 18- 19 . 
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(based upon the price ratios set by the transformation curve) available 
to individual B instead of a specific combination of the two goods. 
Assuming the individuals maximize their satisfaction, we can still deter-
mine the one combination which individual B will hold when individual A 
is at each point on his given indifference curve . Therefore, we can still 
determine a curve MD1, which is analogous to the MD curve found with one 
good defined as a public good o Using arbitrary movements along individual 
B's indifference curve, we can determine individual A's NC1 curve which 
is analogous to the NC curve found wi th the public good definition. The 
combination of private goods 1 and 2 which individual A could hold with-
out making individual B worse off is OQ and OJ, respectively. Individual 
B could hold OG of private good 2 and OK of private good 1 without making 
individual A wor se off . 
The Pareto optima developed in the analysis with two private goods 
can be presented on a utility front i er (Figure 13) . Points X and Y p p 
have the same meaning as points X and Yin Figure 11 except now we are 
considering the quant ity of two pri vate goods to be supplied . The area 
Z Y X shows the infinite number of possible sol utions that leave A, B p p p 
or both bett er off than at Z, where no quantity of private good 2 would p 
be supplied . 
It has been shown that the model used by Musgr ave results i n an i n-
f i nite number of Pare to opti ma when a public good and a pri vate good are 
used or when two pri vat e goods are used. Any conc lusi on derived from 
Musgrave's model is applicable to price theory i n general . Musgrave i s 
cor rect when he concl udes f rom his public goods model that a single Pareto 
opti mum cannot be reached . However, i t appear s that the absence of a 
<( 
~,v 
I 
I 
I 
I 
----------:31 ----
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-', T _.,w 
OrJin.iJ ,'r,Je~ af we/l.1re f-or B 
Figure 13. Utility Frontier with Private Goods 
76 
77 
single optimum solution is not due to the inclusion of a public good in 
the model. Therefore, Musgrave 1s criticism of the price theory of public 
finance, when preferences are assumed to be revealed, is not substantiated 
simply because a single Pareto optimum is not reached under the conditions 
of his model. 16 
Summary 
There are two basic criticisms involving revealed preferences: . (1) 
the individual will not reveal his true preferences for public goods, and 
(2) even if the individual did reveal his true preferences for a public 
good, there is no single solution to the problem of allocating resources 
analogous to that found in the allocation of resources to private goods. 
The first criticism is based on two propositions: (1) an equal 
quantity of a public good is consumed by all taxpayer buyers, and (2) an 
individual taxpayer's demand exerts no influence over the quantity of 
public goods supplied. A model was presented to show the process by 
which the individual would desire to reveal his preferences for a public 
good with the characteristic of joint consumption. The logical conclusion 
of the analysis, based on the model, was that the individual is motivated 
to reveal his true preferences. Under the assumption that the individual 
attempts to maximize his satisfaction, it was concluded that a large num-
her of individuals does not prevent the individual from maximizi ng his 
satisfaction unless the large number of individuals prevents the political 
16 A modified Musgrave-Samuelson model which is more consistent with 
price theory analysis of consumer demand and which has a single solution 
for both private goods and public goods is presented in Chapter V. 
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process from being organized so that the benefit theory of taxation can 
be applied. It was also concluded that the individual is motivated to 
reveal his preferences whenever he knows the benefit principle of taxation 
will be applied by the political mechanism. In the case where all of the 
activities of the government are accepted as one public good, the indi-
vidual is not prevented from maximizing his satisfaction and will reveal 
his preferences for public goods in the market mechanism or in the poli-
tical mechanism. 
The second criticism was found to be based upon the model used by 
Musgrave to criticize the price theory of public finance. The conclusions 
derived by Musgrave are equally applicable to the price theory of private 
goods. The criticism of the price theory of public goods cannot be accepted 
unless it is also accepted as a criticism of the price theory of private 
goods or a new basis for the criticism is fornrulated. 
The criticisms concerning revealed preferences have been a stumbling 
block in the way of the acceptance of the price theory of public finance. 
However, they are not the only criticisms which must be overcome for the 
theory to become very widely accepted. There are at least two basic 
criticisms concerning taxes and the political process which must be 
analyzed. One criticism is that taxes are compulsory payments which are 
not analogous to prices . The other criticism is t hat the political 
mechanism cannot be considered to be analogous to the market me chanism . 
Still other criticisms could be stated in relation to the political pro-
cess but for the most part they can be treated under the above two broad 
categories of criticisms. However, before considering the criticisms of 
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the voluntary exchange theory which are related to the political process, 
the theory is presented in a graphical model which does provide a single 
best solutiono 
CHAP.T.ER V 
THE PRICE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A SUGGESTED APPROACH 
The Pareto optimum is an i mportant concept in the development of the 
price theory of public finance . Musgrave's criticism that no single best 
solution exists in the supply of public goods which is analogous to the 
Pareto optimum in the supply of private goods was rejected in Chapter IV . 
The rejection of the criticism was based on the fact that the model used 
by Musgrave to prove the validity of the criticism was not entirely con-
sistent with the price theory of pri vate goods . The model did not yield 
1 the Pareto optimum solution when just private goods were used. However, 
no attempt was made .in Chapter IV to present a general equilibrium model 
which is more consistent with price theory and which does yield a Pareto 
optimum when just private goods are considered . Therefore, the first step 
is to develop such a model fo r private goods and then apply the methodology 
developed to the supply of public goods . 
1 The disturbing thing about the Musgrave -::-Samuelson model is that . the 
model makes use of a barter exchange determination of price racios which 
is analogous to the "Edgeworth box analysis .. " The arbitrary placing of 
one individual on his indifference curve while determining the combination 
of goods the second individual prefers to hold determines nothing .more 
than a contract curve . It, therefore, merely establishes those changes 
in social variables which can take place through trading . Preferences 
are not revealed . Preferences are known and the individuals barter i n 
accordance with the known preferences . For a rat her crypti c remark on his 
own methodology see Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge, 1948), pp . 237- 238 . 
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A Modified Musgrave-Samuelson Model 
Figure 14 presents a general equilibrium model for private goods. 
The three diagrams are basically the same as used in the Musgrave-
Samuelson model, but the methodology has been modified. Instead of plac-
ing one individual at a point on his indifference curve while letting a 
second individual obtain the quantities of the goods he wants, the price 
of one good and the income of both individuals are held constant while 
price consumption curves are developed for both individuals. The price 
consumption line gives the combination of the two goods which the indi-
vidual would desire at various price ratios of the two goods. The analy-
sis up to this point is just the standard procedure for the development 
of a demand curve. Now, however, price consumption lines are summed 
rather than converted into demand curves. The combination of the two 
goods desired by individual A at the price ratio given by lC line of 
attainable combinations is added to the combination of the two goods de-
sired by individual Bat the price ratio given by lD line of attainable 
combinations. This process is merely the summation of the quantities of 
both goods at a given price ratio between the two goods. It is analogous 
to the horizontal summation of demand curves except the demand for two 
goods is stated simultaneously. An equilibrium for consumers is reached 
when the sum of the individual price consumption lines intersects the 
transformation curve. However, general equilibrium will only exist when 
the price ratio of the two goods is also tangent to the transformation 
curve at the point where the sum of the price consumption lines inter-
sects the transformation curve . In Figure 14, this occurs with the price 
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ratio given by 3C line of at t ainable combinations for individual A and 
3D for individual B. The tangency can be shown diagramatically by summing 
A B the indifference curves i 3 and i 3 • With the assumption of pure competition 
in the markets of the two goods, the prices and allocation of resources 
shown in Figure 14 represents the general long-run equilibrium solution 
and is the Pareto optimum solution in the case of private goods . If pure 
·-·- .- ; 
competition does not exist in the market for both goods, the Pareto opti-
mum will not be achieved because then there i s no market force to cause 
the ratio of prices to be equal to the rati o of marginal costs (i .e . , the 
slope of the lines of attainable combinat i ons equal to the slope of the 
transformation curve). 
Figure 15 shows the three possible situations. Point A indicates a 
situation where the price of private good 1 is greater than the marginal 
cost of producing private good 1. Point C indicates a situation where 
the price of private good 2 i s greater than the marginal cost of pro-
2 ducing private good 2 . Point B indicates the Pareto optimum presented 
in Figure 14 . It is apparent t hat there are an infinite number of solu-
3 tions depending upon the specific market s i tuations whi ch might exi st . 
However, is it only when pure competi t i on exists that the sum of the 
2 In both cases, it is assumed that the price of the other good i s 
equal to or less than the ·marginal costs of producing t he good . 
3The infinite number of solutions i n thi s model is not the same as 
the infinite number of solutions which exi sts in t he Musgr ave-Samuelson 
model . In the Musgrave-Samuelson model a specific solution depends upon 
the bargaini ng power of the i ndividuals which i s a ssumed t o exist in the 
barter exchange of goods . I n t his modi f ied model , a s pecific s oluti on 
depends upon the mar ket situati ons which are assumed to exist in t he pro-
duction and exchange economy . 
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individual price consumption lines intersects the transformation curve at 
a point where the sum of the indifference curve is tangent to the trans-
formation curve. When any other type of market situation exists in the 
production of either good, the price of the good is greater than the 
marginal costs. Therefore, the ratio of prices (i.e., slope of line of 
attainable combinations and slope of indifference curve when the indi-
vidual maximizes his satisfaction) cannot equal the ratio of marginal 
costs. If both goods are produced in monopolistic markets, the ratio of 
prices may equal the ratio of marginal costs. However, the government can 
achieve a Pareto optimum allocation of resources even given the equal 
consumption definition of a public good, if it is assumed that the indi-
viduals do express their true preferences for various quantities of the 
goods at different price ratios. Figure 16 gives the diagramatic pre-
sentation of the determination of the Pareto optimum allocation of re-
sources with one good defined as a public good. The methodology used is 
the same as developed for the private goods model. The procedure for the 
development of the individual price consumption lines is not changed by 
the fact that one of the goods is a public good as long as true prefer-
ences are revealed. However, due to the change in the definition of one 
of the goods, the procedure for summing the price consumption curves must 
be changed. The combination of the two goods desired by individual A, 
when he must take~ given quantity of the public good, is added to the 
combination of the two goods desired by individual B, when he must take 
the same given quantity of the public good . This change is just the 
change to a vertical summation of demand curves from the horizontal 
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4 
summation of demand curves used in the private goods model. The quantity 
of the public good is held constant and the demand for the two goods is 
summed whereas, before the price ratio was held constant and the demand 
for the two goods was summed. 
The intersection of the sum of the price consumption curves with the 
transformation curve provides a consumer equil i br i um as long as the govern-
ment charges each individual according to his expressed demand. In 
Figure 16, individual A will pay for the pub l ic good in accordance with 
the price ratio given by 3C line of attainable combinations and individual 
B will pay for the publ i c good in accordance with the price ratio given 
s by SD line of attainable combinations. 
The solution presented in Figure 16 is the Pareto optimum allocation 
A B 
of resources because the summation of indifference curves i 3 and is is 
6 tangent to the transformation curve. The same conditions for general 
equilibrium and for the Pareto optimum allocation of resources have been 
met in the public goods model as in the pr i vate goods model. The market 
4 This is in accordance with Bowen's concept of vertically summing 
demand curves but is not the same thing as Samuelson's summation of in-
difference curves. See footnote 6, below . 
SThis is taxation in accordance with the benefit theory of taxation 
which provides consumer equilibrium. 
6 The method of summing indifference curves is the same as that used 
by Samuelson. The exi stence of a single Pareto optimum is the result of 
holding income constant in the analysis . The difference between the 
methodology used here and Samuelson's methodology i s that it employs 
the summation of price consumpti on lines (i . e . , demand schedules of the 
two goods) to insure consumer equi libri um r ather than us i ng the exchange 
analysis of the "Edgeworth box" type which only insur es that one indi-
vidual is not made worse off while the o t her i s permitted to become better 
off. 
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conditions cannot be assumed to force the allocation of resources toward 
the optimum but, if pure competition exists in the private goods market 
and if the government prices in accordance with expressed demands for the 
public good, the government can achieve a Pareto optimum allocation of 
resources. 
The Pareto optimum or single best solution analogous to the Pareto 
optimum may represent a specific role for government in the production of 
public goods. However, the model developed in this chapter involves 
assumptions which may be subject to certain criticisms. Therefore, the 
next section of this chapter is a discussion of a couple of the major 
criticisms which may be raised against the suggested approach. Chapter 
VII will deal with the role of government in relation to the voluntary 
exchange approach and the model developed here . 
Important Assumptions in the Model 
The assumption that income is given data in the model is the assump-
tion most likely to be criticized. The acceptance of income as given may 
be taken as an implication that the existing distribution of income is 
the "best" distribution . 7 Obviously, there are many countries where such 
an assumption would rightfully be subject to criticism because of the 
extreme inequities of the existing income distribution . However 9 some 
economists may accept income as given on the grounds that it is the best 
7 Musgrave has emphasized the concept of separating the allocation of 
resources from the distri but i on of income . One reason for this separation 
is the assumed necessity of accepting t he given i ncome i n the a llocati on 
of resources as the "bes t " distributi on of i ncome . 
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assumption possible in most situations and because there is no objective 
basis for evaluating what is the "best" distribution of income. 8 This 
justification is not the only justification for accepting income as given 
in the suggested approach. 
The income which is accepted as given in the model is neither a 
personal income distribution nor a functional income distribution. 9 It 
is not a distribution of income at all. The income which is accepted as 
given is the income which the individual expects to use in the consumption 
of goods during the period covered by the model. The amount of this in-
come depends upon the individual's wealth and the individual's share of 
the personal income distribution in the past as well as upon many other 
factors. The main point is that the sum of the individual incomes does 
not have to equal the distribution of income in any particular period of 
time. The fact that this income may be low for a particular individual 
because he holds very little wealth and/or he has not had a favorable 
share of the personal income distribution in the past may not be of too 
much importance. The suggested approach is to accept the individuals own 
evaluation of what income he expects to have available and wants to use 
for the consumption of goods. The fact that income is given in the model 
does not suggest which distribution of income is ''best." 
8 Delbert A. Snider, Economics Principles and I ssues (Homewood, 1962), 
p. 616 0 
9 Personal income distributi on shows how income is divided among 
individuals and families, irrespective of the sources of the income . 
Functional income distribut i on shows the income flowi ng from the payment 
for resources in the form of wages, i nt erest, rents, and profi ts . Ibid . , 
pp O 578-579 0 
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The use of price consumption lines instead of just indifference curves 
may also be subject to certain criticisms. The slope of an indifference 
curve may be considered as the demand for one good in terms of another 
10 good. However, this is only true in a barter analysis where there is 
no production of goods . In this case, the slope of the indifference 
curve (i.e . , the marginal rate of substitution of one good for the other) 
can be considered as a demand for the one good in terms of the other good. 
The marginal rate of substitution only gives the value (price) of a good 
to one individual when his activity is restricted to trading a quantity 
of the good he has for some quantity of the other good. 
In a market society, the individual is assumed to have an income 
available for spending on goods and services which are to be produced by 
business firms . Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution does not 
constitute a demand for the good. The price consumption line on the other 
hand is a statement of the demand for both goods. If the assumed price 
of the first good is not consistent with the market situation in the pro-
duction of that good, the market will cause a change in the price . The 
assumption that the market situation is one of pure competition makes it 
possible to determine the price of the one good before starting the analy-
11 
sis and avoid the complications of adjusting and readjusting prices. 
The fact remains that price consumption lines are a statement of the 
lOibid . , pp . 314-315 . 
11 When pure competition exists in the production of both goods the 
price of each must equal the marginal costs of producing each good. 
Therefore, the rat io of prices (slope of the line of attainable combina-
tions) must equal the ratio of margi nal costs (slope of the transformation 
curve) . 
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demand for both goods when income is given in a market society. Figure 
15 indicates the effect of the type of market situation on the allocation 
of resources to the production of goodso 
Summary 
The nongraphical models of the voluntary exchange or price theory of 
public finance were presented in Chapter II. Each model emphasized differ-
ent aspects of price theory analysis and different aspects of the political 
process. Despite the differences, all of the nongraphical models did re-
present attempts to answer all three economic questions related to 
public goods (i .e., which goods and services shall be produced by the 
government, what quantity of these goods and services shall be produced, 
and what tax-price shall be charged for the goods and services which are 
produced) . 
The graphical models of the price theory of public finance pre-
sented in Chapter III were also based on the concept that expenditures 
and revenues of government should be determined simultaneously. Many 
limitations and criticisms were pointed out in relation to the various 
graphical models o However, the two basic theoretical criticisms which 
concern the revealing of preferences were not treated until Chapter IV o 
In Chapter IV, these theoretical criticisms were r ejected o Pr eferences, 
if they do exist, will be revealed either by modifying private good con-
sumption behavior or by affecting the tax- price of public goodso The 
criticism that even when preferences are assumed to be revealed there 
is no single best soluti on analogous to the Par eto optimum solution in 
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the supply of private goods was shown to be dependent upon the barter ex-
change type model used to present the criticism . 
In this chapter , a modified Musgrave-Samuelson model was developed 
which indicated that there is a single best soluti on in the supply of 
public goods which is analogous to the Pareto optimum solution in the 
supply of private goods . Also, two of the most likely criticisms of the 
suggested model were discussed. The acceptance of income as given does 
not imply that the present distribut i on of i ncome is the best distribution. 
It merely represents the acceptance of the indivi dual's own evaluation 
of the income to be used for consumption as the proper starting poi nt of 
economic analysis. This acceptance of income as given has the same im-
plications as generally considered in the price theory of private goods. 
The use of price consumption lines as the joint demand s chedules of two 
goods is more acceptable than the use of the marginal rate of substitution 
as the joint demand schedules of two goods i n a production economy. The 
use of the marginal rates of substitution as demand schedules is only con-
sistent with a barter exchange economy wher e known preferences are re-
vealed through direct exchanges of goods . 
The criticisms of the voluntary exchange or price theory of public 
finance have been stumbling blocks to the widespread acceptance of the 
theory . However, the theoretical and practical cri ticisms not di rectly 
related to the political process have not been found in thi s study to 
be sufficient reason for the rejection of the pri ce theory of public 
finance . Therefore, the next two chapters will t reat first the cr iti-
cisms directly r elated t o the appli cation of the theory to the political 
process and then a suggested approach to the study of the determination 
of constitutional and policy rules of governmento 
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CHAPTER VI 
A CRITIQUE OF CRITICISMS: TAX.ES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
There are two broad categories of criticisms involving taxes and the 
political process. The first criticism is that taxes are a compulsory 
payment which cannot be considered analogous to prices . The second criti-
cism is that the political mechanism cannot be considered to operate in 
a manner analogous to the operation of the market mechanism. Both of 
these criticisms are implicit in E. R. A. Seligman's history of taxation. 1 
He presents the history of taxation as an evolutionary process, moving 
from the voluntary contributions to tribal chiefs, to compulsory pay-
2 
ments, such as direct taxation by a central government. 
The first criticism is more or less explicit in Seligman's history 
of taxation because taxes are considered to be compulsory in a modern 
society. However, since a history of taxation places taxes in the setting 
of the political organization which happens to exist at various points in 
1 Essays in Taxation (London, 1913), pp. 1-6. 
2neViti DeMarco on the other hand has presented the history of taxa-
tion as an evolution in forms of voluntary payments, moving from .voluntary 
contributions of goods and services to tribal chiefs, to voluntary contri-
butions of money such as with .direct taxation by a central government . 
The existence of constitutional provisions of all representative govern-
ments that no tax be determined or collected unless it is approved by the 
representatives of the people is cited as evidence that taxes are sti ll 
voluntary in nature . Antonio DeViti DeMarco, First Principles £f Publi c 
Finance, trans . Edith Pavlo Marget (London ~ 1936), p . 120 . 
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history, Seligman's view of the compulsory nature of taxation may be re-
lated to the second criticism instead of the first. This recognition that 
taxes must be discussed in relation to some particular political mechanism 
is an important point in any discussion of the coerciveness of taxes. It 
is also necessary to consider the coerciveness relative to some specifically 
3 
stated criterion. Therefore, the discussion of taxes places them in a 
specified political mechanism and the conclusions are in terms of the de-
gree of coercion relative to prices determi ned in a specified market 
4 
situation. 
The second criticism is also difficult to analyze since there are so 
many factors which have to be assumed as given or treated in relation to 
various alternatives. Therefore, the approach taken in the second section 
of this chapter is to define various political situations in terms similar 
to accepted definitions of market situations . The similarities and differ-
ences which exist between the hypothetical situations are discussed in 
terms of the degree of coercion which would exi st in the supply of goods 
3 Patinkin gives a good discuss i on of vo l untar y and i nvol un t ary em-
ployment pointing out the necessity of havi ng an established cri te r ion 
upon which to evaluate the degree of voluntariness that exis ts in a par ti-
cular situation . Don Patinkin 9 Money . Interest and Prices (Evanston ~ 1950), 
pp. 211-214 . 
4coercion must be discussed i n terms of the degree of coer ci on because 
compulsion exists i n every form of organi zation . DeVit i DeMarco states : 
"Compulsion exists i n every lega l association of indivi duals ; i n bus i ness 
organizations, in par tnershi ps, i n the chur ch , and especially in labor 
unions . " DeVi ti DeMarco, First Pr inc i ples of Publ i c Finance, p . SOn . 
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and services o The conclusions 9 therefore, are in terms of the degree of 
coercion in one political situation relative to alternative political 
situations and relative to various market situations. 
In the discussion on the po litical mechanism presented in section 
two of this chapter, it becomes apparent that the constitutional rules 
establish the political situation when the government operates under a 
constitution. Therefore, the next chapter is a discussion of the deter-
minates of constitutional rules and of the effects of some constitutional 
rules and policy rules upon the supply of public goods. 
Prices and Taxes 
The consideration of the point at which compulsion to act in a speci-
fied way in the case of both prices and taxes is one approach to consid-
ering the degree of coercion which exists for taxes relative to prices. 
It is assumed in the discussion that prices are impersonally determined 
in a purely competitive market situation, and that taxes are impersonally 
determined by a vote of all the individuals in the society . 
The market determines the individual's per unit price of a good by 
the equality of the total demand for the good and the total supply of the 
good. The total demand for the good is the sum of the individual demands . 
The individual demands are expressed by the individuals' purchasing the 
good in the quantity desired at the price that it is offered for sale . 
5 Haavelmo's discussion of the need for a comparison between alterna-
tive economic models or framewo r ks unde r which a society may operate is 
the bas i s for the approach used here . Trygve Haavelmop "The Notion of 
Involuntary Economic Decisions , " Econometrica p Volume XVII (1950) 9 p . 1 . 
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The market supply s chedule of the good i s the sum of the quantities 
which will be produced by i ndividual firms a t various marginal costs o 
Each firm must offer the good for sale at the per unit price determined 
by the entire market for the good because i f a firm offered it at a 
higher pri ce the firm would have no s ales and if a firm offered it at a 
lower price the firm would not be able to cover the costs of production 
in the long run. 
The vote determines the individual ' s tax per unit of the good by the 
equality of the total demand for the good and the marginal cost of the 
government production of the good . The total demand for the good is the 
sum of the individual demands. The individual demands are expressed by 
the individuals' voting on the quantity that they would desire at all 
of the various prices poss i ble o The government is under a pol i cy r ule 
to deliver the quantity of the good to each individual in accordance 
with their expressed demand at the t ax-price de t ermined by the equality 
of the total demand and the marginal costs of production. In both of the 
above frameworks of analysisp the good can be assumed to be the same good 
so as to eliminate problems which are related only to the differences 
in types of goods generally supplied through the use of prices and those 
generally supplied through the use of taxes . 
The issue basic to the analysis is what cons titutes a sale i n the 
market. The legal and account i ng concept of a sa le i s accepted in this 
6 
analysis . A sale takes place at the time at which some legally binding 
6The concept of the point of sale i n accounting has been one of the 
never ending problems of the accountant . W. Pat on and W. Pa t on , Jr . , 
Corporation Accounts and Statements (New Yo rk , 1955) , Chapter 10 . 
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evidence of sale has changed hands between the buyer and seller. This 
means that the point (time) of sale is dependent upon policy rules of the 
government as to what is considered as legally binding evidence of a sale. 
It logically follows that a sale in the market is a compulsory act once 
it is considered to have taken place and that the price is a compulsory 
payment once the sale has taken place. The legally binding evidence of 
sale may be the exchange of money or goods for goods. It may also be 
the joint signing of a contract which legally binds the buyer to pay a 
certain sum (the sale price) at a specified time and the seller to 
7 physically deliver certain goods at a specified time. Neither money nor 
goods have to physically exchange hands for a sale to take place. The 
sale price stated in the contract reflects the per unit price to the 
individual determined in the market. 
The point of sale, in the case of a tax, is when the individuals of 
society cast their votes for the quantity of the good desired at the 
various possible prices. The government is legally bound by a policy 
rule to establish the price in accordance with the vote of the individuals 
and the marginal cost or production. The individual is legally bound to 
accept the quantity of the good that he voted for at the tax-price set in 
accordance with the established policy rule. The casting of a vote is 
fully analogous to the signing of a contract . No money or goods exchange 
hands between buyer and seller or between taxpayer and government at the 
7The laws and customs of nations regarding when and what constitutes 
a sale vary as to the degree of compulsion exerted by the government to 
enforce contracts of sale, but most nations whose economic system can be 
classified as a market system make the contrac t for sale a legally binding 
transaction . 
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point of sale, but once the point of sale is reached, the price or tax 
and the quantity to be supplied are determined. Once the sale is consum-
mated the price and tax are both compulsory under the given policy rules. 
Before the point of sale is reached, there is no market price and like-
wise no tax-price. 
The conclusion that taxes are no more coercive than prices is depen-
dent upon the type of political mechanism which is assumed to exist. The 
conclusion clearly may not be valid if the political mechanism does not 
provide a means by which indivi duals vote for both quanti ties and prices 
of each good . The conclusion also may not be valid if the government is 
not subject to a policy rule which makes taxes and quantity of the good 
supplied dependent upon the expressed desires of individuals. However, 
the conclusion makes it clear that there is nothing inherent in the collec-
tion of taxes which is more coercive than the collection of a price . Taxes 
and prices are merely a means of expressing the payment side of a trans-
action, If coercion exists in taxation it is not because a tax was used 
as a means of payment i nstead of a pr i ce. Coercion in taxation must re-
sult from some factor which effects the level of taxes to be collected for 
a good or the quantity of the good to be supplied at a particular level 
of taxes . 
The Market Mechanism and the Pol i tical Mechanism 
The degree of coercion which exi sts in t he pol i tical mechanism rela-
tive to that which exists in t he market mechani sm may be analyzed by de-
fining different political s i tuations (i .e . , constitutional rules) in terms 
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of accepted definitions of market situationso The political situations 
like the market situations are merely hypothetical situations. Specific 
real world political situations come closer to being described by one of 
the hypothetical situations than any of the others. However, no specific 
real world political situation is completely described by any of the hy-
pothetical situations o Therefore, the conclusions only refer to hypothe-
tical situations. However, the conclusions are likely to apply for the 
real world situation as long as it can be said that a particular real 
world political situation is described most closely by one particular hy-
pothetical situation . 
Market polypoly is "a state of mind of sellers' who know that they 
have competition, but, in making up their minds about changing their 
selling or productive policies do not ponder over what their competitors' 
reactions might be o 119 
Political polypoly is a state of mind of voters who know that they 
have competitors in the form of other voters with different desires for 
the same publ ic good, but, in making up their minds about voting for 
particular selling or productive policies do not ponder over what their 
voter-competitors' reactions might be o 
8 For purposes of analysis, Machlup 0s terminology is adopted because 
it is based on the psychological aspects of the market which are more easily 
compared with the psychological aspects of the political situations and 
because it considers the market situations separately from the concept of 
the entry of new firms, plipoly o Fritz Machlup, The Economies .2!_ Sellers' 
Competition (Baltimore, 1952)0 
9 Ibid o, po 136 o 
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In market polypoly, it is usually considered that many buyers and 
many sellers of a homogeneous product exist. In political polypoly, this 
condition is not of importance . The buyers and sellers are the same in-
dividuals in a very direct sense and the existence of many is assured. 
All of the individuals which constitute a governmental unit of society 
are both the buyers and the sellers o A homogeneous product is also not 
an issue since all voters vote on the production of each good separately, 
Even in the case where the economic good is considered to be all govern-
mental services, the homogeneous product condition is met by the political 
mechanism. The necessary condition is that government acts in accordance 
with the vote of the individuals in regard to the quantity and price of 
the good to be supplied and in accordance with known policy rules of gov-
ernment. The government is thus considered to be nothing more than an 
organization for the production of the goods and services desired by the 
indiyiduals of society. 
It would be necessary that the voting be for various quantities of 
the good at various possible prices in order to meet the conditions of 
the voluntary exchange theor y . A vote on one quantity of the good at one 
price is not sufficient for a governmental or ganization which is to be 
neutral in its own productive activities. The government must know the 
various combinations of quantities and prices that individuals desire so 
that they can be compared with the cost of producing the various quantities 
of the good o The essence of such a political situation is that the voter 
reveals his true preferences without concern about the preferences which 
others are revealing . The voter knows that the governmental organization 
is restricted by consti tutional rules that require the production policy 
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of the government to be based on the total revealed preferences and costs 
of production. He also knows the constituti onal rules require the taxa-
tion policy of the government to be based on the individual preferences 
for the quantity of the good to be supplied to the individual. 
The situations in the mar ket and pol i tical mechanism are basically 
the same as those used in the analysis of taxes and prices . The con-
clusion, as would be expected, is the same . Only now it can be said that 
under the defined market situation and pol itical situation there is no 
difference i n the degree of coercion which would exist . 
Market oligopoly is a state of mind of sellers who know that they 
have competitors, and, in making up their minds about changing their 
selling or production policies, do take i nt o consideration what their 
10 
competitors ' reactions might be . 
Political oligopoly is a state of mind of governmental officials who 
know that they have competitors (other governmental off icials), and, in 
making up their minds about changing their selling or production policies, 
do take into consideration what the compe t itors ' r eactions might be . 
The usual cause of marke t ol igopoly i s fewnes s of sellers, which 
gives the individual seller an awareness of the fac t that his actions 
affect the total market situati on and that others notice his actions and 
react to them. Political oligopoly i s similar in that i ts cause is the 
fewness of voters directly affect i ng t he to tal market situati on . Based 
on the considerations made i n Chapter IV, i t is assumed that true pre-
ferences would be revealed by individuals i f they had the opportuni ty to 
10 Ibid . , pp . 349-353 . 
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vote. Therefore, the difference between political polypoly and political 
oligopoly is not considered to be the desire of the individual to reveal 
his true preferences. The difference is that in political polypoly the 
government as an organization is neutral in the determination of quantity 
of goods to be produced whereas in political oligopoly the government as 
an organization is not neutralo The situation is one where the government's 
selling and production policies are directly determined by a vote of re-
presentatives of individuals in the society rather than a vote of all in-
dividuals in the society . Each representative is aware of the fact that 
his actions affect the total market situation and that his competitors 
notice his actions and react to them. His competitors are the represen-
tatives of other individuals in the society. Each representative will 
temper his actions because of the reactions which might be forthcoming 
from his competitors. The consequences of the constitutional rules are 
that the representative is aware of his position in the determination of 
what and how much at what price is to be produced by the government, and 
each representative takes into consideration the reactions of other re-
presentatives when deciding the preferences he will reveal. 
It is still possible but not necessary to assume that each repre-
sentative is attempting to obtain for those whom he represents the quan-
tity and price relationship for each public good which they would desireo 
If the representative is not attempting to obtain the quantity and price 
relationship desired by the individuals he represents, it can be consid-
ered that coercion is greater than in political polypoly. The higher 
degree of coercion is a result of a situation where the constitutional 
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rules for political organization do not permit the type of voting necessary 
for the government to be neutral in the determination of selling and pro-
duction policy. 
Market monopoly is a state of mind "of a selleI who knows neither 
any individuals nor any particular groups of sellers with whom he is in 
11 
competition." 
Political monopoly is a state of mind of a government official who 
knows neither any governmental officials nor any particular groups of 
society (political party) with whom he is in competition . 
In market monopoly, the individual seller is unaware of a need for 
considering the reactions of any other sellers in the market. Therefore, 
his selling and production policies can vary greatly depending upon the 
motivation which is assumed to be the basis of his actions. He does not 
believe that the market process will require him to choose any particular 
policy. The pessimistic monopolist will attempt to make the most of the 
situation for himself in the short run. The optimistic monopolist may 
attempt to maintain his position by operati ng to make the most of the 
situation in the long run or he may attempt to maintain his position by 
12 
advertising and research. 
Political monopoly is very similar to market monopoly . The single 
government official determines the selling and production policies for 
all public goods without having to compete (vote) with any other govern-
mental officials or political parties . He does not feel a need for 
11 Ibid . , p . 544 . 
12 Ibid . , pp . 555-557 . 
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considering the reactions of any other representatives of individuals of 
society because he believes he is the sole representative of the people. 
However, he may be pessimistic about his position because other repre-
sentatives of the people may gain popular or military support. There-
fore, he will attempt to make the most of the situation for himself in 
the short runo The political monopolist may also be optimistic about 
his position because he feels that he can act to prevent any other re-
presentative of the people from interfering with his positiono As a 
result, he may operate to make the most of his situation in tl:).e long run 
by relying upon his influence over all possible competitors (all other 
political officials or all other political parties) or he may attempt to 
maintain his position by propaganda and by public demonstrations of 
being the "true" representative of the peopleo 
In political monopoly, the taxpayer is reduced to a buyer and serves 
little if any role in the determination of what is to be produced. The 
potential buyer of a good in the market may be faced with a higher price 
and, therefore, must modify the quantity which he purchases due to the 
existence of a monopoly seller. The taxpayer-buyer of a public good 
has no such opportunity in the case of political monopoly. Public goods 
which have the characteristics of jointness of supply would have both 
price and quantity determined independent of the desires of the indivi-
dualo Even without the characteristic of jointness of supply~ in the 
case of political monopoly, the price ~nd quantity might both be deter-
mined arbitrarilyo The only opportunities for the individual to obtain 
his desires in regard to public goods are to escape from the political 
control of the governmental unit under which he has lived or to find 
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some governmental official, or group which can take over as the accepted 
representative of the people. 
Coercion in political monopoly is considerably greater than under 
market monopoly. Market monopoly may cause higher prices than under 
alternative market situations but the individual can still adjust the 
quantity of the good he purchases in accordance with the higher price. 
Therefore, economic freedom, in one sense at least, is not restricted by 
the existence of market monopoly. This, however, is not true for poli-
tical monopoly, where both quantity and price are arbitrarily set by the 
government. Economic freedom is restricted and coercion does exist. How-
ever, the individual can still maximize his satisfaction for all goods, 
if he considers all governmental services as a single good. In this case, 
he must alter his consumption of private goods in accordance with the 
marginal utility per dollar's worth of public goods arbitrarily estab-
lished by the actions of the political monopolist, 
Coercion does not depend upon whether or not the individual can 
maximize his satisfaction because the individual can always maximize his 
satisfaction by altering what he considers a.s an economic good. The de-
gree of coercion does depend upon the constitutional rules that have been 
established in the society. A change in the type of the market situation 
may not affect the degree of coercion that exists. Therefore, the poli-
tical mechanism is more coercive in nature than the market mechanism 
unless it is assumed that the political mechanism can be classified as 
political polypoly. 
Pliopoly is the term applied by Machlup to the concept of the entry 
of new firms in an industry and it is the existence of pliopoly which 
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tends to eliminate profits in the supply of goods in the market mech-
13 
anism. Pliopoly, however, does not have to be restricted to the actual 
entry of new firms. It depends upon an objective evaluation of an out-
sider as to whether or not is is probable that new firms wi ll enter any 
given industry . 
A similar concept could be developed for the political mechanism. 14 
Political pliopoly would refer to the probability that the officials in 
the government will act in accordance with the desires of the individual 
in the society. The existence of political pliopoly would, therefore, 
tend to eliminate coercion in the political mechanism. The objective 
factors which should be considered in evaluating whether or not govern-
mental officials are likely to act in accordance with the desires of the 
individuals in society are complex, but at least a few could be briefly 
pointed out. The most obvious is whether or not there is a regular pro-
cess by which the individual can express his desires. Another would be 
13 Ibid., P • 211. 
14 The political mechanism has no automatic factors which tend to 
eliminate profits • . Whether or not the . government should make profits 
could be established in the form of a constitutional rule or, as is 100re 
likely, in the form of a policy rule of government . The absence or 
presence of profits in the supply of public goods is of extreme impor-
tance since it determines whether the total budget of the government will 
be a surplus budget, balanc.ed budget or deficit budget .. Therefor e, four 
possible policy rules are listed with their affect upon the total budget , 
assuming that they are consistently applied to the pricing of every public 
good. (1) Average Cost Pricing Rule--balanced budget, (2) Marginal Cos t 
Pricing Rule--budget determined by the value of goods supplied having 
increasing or decreasing costs~ (3) Maxi mum Pr oduction of Public Goods 
Pricing Rule (i .e . , increasing cost goods a t average cost and decreasing 
cost goods at marginal cost)--deficit budget, and 4) Minimum Production 
of Public Goods Pricing Rule (i .e . , increasing cost goods at mar ginal 
cost and decreas i ng cost goods at average cost)--surp l us budget . 
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whether or not desires are expressed for just a quantity at a given price 
or a price at a given quantity or for various quantities at various possible 
prices. Still another would be whether or not the governmental policy 
rules encourage the governmental official to act i .n accordance with the 
desires of the individuals in the society . 
It can be considered, from these few factors affecting the existence 
or nonexistence of political pliopoly, that it would be most likely to 
occur under the constitutional rules (polit i cal s i tuation) classified as 
political polypoly. The individual voter does have the opportunity to 
express his desires for the various quantities at the various prices 
through the voting process and the policy rules of government require 
the governmental official to act in accordance with the vote-expressed 
desires of the individuals in society . However, political pliopoly is 
not necessary because governmental officials once in office may be able 
to circumvent the policy rules or even the constitutional rules. There-
fore, political pliopoly is not assured as a component part of political 
polypoly but it is most likely to exist under the constitutional rules 
of political polypoly . 
In the case of political oligopoly, the three objective factors 
leading to political pliopoly, listed above, are not an inherent part 
of the political situation. However, this does not rule out the possi-
bility of political pliopoly existing . Under political oligopoly, the 
extent to which the representative can reveal desires different from the 
"true" desires of the individuals whom he represents, depends upon the 
constitutional rules as to the voting for representati ves and upon the 
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constitutional rules 15 as to the voting (balloting) process for specific 
goods and services. In other words, the likelihood of coercion (the 
absence of political pliopoly), depends upon whether or not the repre-
sentative is aware of possible reactions on the part of the voters that 
choose the representative and this may in turn depend, at least in part, 
on the knowledge that the voter is likely to have concerning whether or 
not the representative actually does attempt to express the desires of 
those whom he represents o If the representatives had to cast ballots 
for various quantities at various prices for each public good because of 
a constitutional rulep the voters could be aware of the fact that the 
representative is modifying the individual voter's true preferences. 
If the representative merely casts a vote for or against a specific quan-
tity and price of each public good, as is usually the case, the voter 
has less opportunity to be aware of the modif ication of the individual 
voter's true preferences o The latter constitutional rule makes it possi-
ble for the representative to bargain in the pol itical process, before 
the decision to produce any public good comes to a ballot , and to assure 
himself that his vote can be cast without causing reactions on the part 
of those who vote the representative into office. 
15 DeMarco states the necessary conditions as follows~ "Only if the 
taxpayers participate in the initial calculation of wants, in which each 
person judges the economic advisabili ty of paying a given tax in order to 
obtain in exchange a given public service » and only i f this calculation 
is subjected to annual revision and is open to cr iticism and continuous 
public discussion by the Press, the pol itical parties, the parliament, 
is it possible to have a guarantee that what is i nvolved is a productive 
public expenditure--that is one which is regarded as such by t hose who 
bear the cost." First Principles in Public Finance, P o 118 0 
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Political pliopoly is least likely to occur under the constitutional 
rules of political monopoly. The only apparent reason that political 
pliopoly might exist would be because of the altruistic motives of the 
governmental official. The existence of policy rules of government, 
which correspond to the objective factors considered above, would consti-
tute an objective factor indicating the existence of political pliopoly 
even in the case of political monopoly. The policy rules of the govern-
ment replace the constitutional rules as objective factors but policy 
rules are not controlled or limited by other constitutional rules in the 
case of political monopoly and, therefore, depend upon the public spirit 
of the governmental officials. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the market mechanism 
and political mechanism in regard to coercion is that the political 
mechanism is likely to be more coercive than the market mechanism but 
that the degree of coercion in the political mechanism is dependent upon 
the constitutional rules that establish the particular mechanism. Also 
it can be concluded that certain const i tutional rules and/ or policy rules 
of the government can be considered as objective evidence that the de-
gree of coercion present in any specific polit i cal situation is less than 
it otherwise would have been. 
Summary 
There are two broad categories of criticisms concerning taxes and 
the political process: (1) Taxes are compulsory payments and are not 
analogous to prices; (2) The polit i cal mechanism cannot ope r ate in a 
manner analogous to the operation of the marke t mechanism . The view 
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that the history of taxation i s an evolutionary process moving from volun-
tary payments to compulsory payments i s related to both criti cisms because 
taxes are considered within the particular political mechanisms which 
exist at various points of time. Taxes must be discussed in terms of 
some exis t ing political mechani sm or some hypothetical political mechanism. 
When taxes are considered in an "ideal II hypothetical political mech-
anism, they are no more coercive than prices . This conclusion is only 
valid for the hypothetical pol i tical mechani sm used in the analysis. 
However, at least it can be sai d that t axes ar e merely the payment side 
of a transaction just like prices . The degree of coercion depends upon 
the political mechanism which determines the amount of taxes to be collected, 
and the quantity of goods and services to be supplied and not upon the 
form of payment made to obtain the goods and services . 
The comparison of hypothetical market situations (market polypoly, 
market oligopoly, and market 100nopoly) wi th hypothetical pol i tical situa-
tions (political polypoly, political oligopoly, and pol i tical monopoly) 
resulted in the conclusion that t he political mechanism does no t have to be 
more coercive than the market mechani sm . However, this conclusion depends 
upon the possibilities of having a political mechanism which corresponds 
to the hypothetical situation of politi cal polypoly . In the r eal world, 
the political mechanism is more likely t o correspond t o the hypothetical 
situation of political oligopoly . Ther efore, the polit i cal mechani sm is 
likely to be more coercive than t he market mechanism. However , the 
existence of certain factors which correspond t o hypotheti cal pol i tical 
pliopoly may be cons ider ed as evidence that the degree of coerci on i s 
less than it woul d otherwi se be . 
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The analysis of this chapter has shown that constitutional rules 
and policy rules of government do have an effect upon economic variables 
and economic analysis. Therefore, the next chapter represents a 
suggested approach to the problems related to the political process. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES AND POLICY RULES OF GOVERNMENT: 
A SUGGESTED APPROACH 
The study of constitutional rules and policy rules of government can-
not be ignored by the economist who follows the voluntary exchange or 
price theory of public finance o This fact was recogni zed by the early 
followers of the voluntary exchange approach and it is true today . The 
analysis of the criticisms related to taxation and the political process 
presented in Chapter VI confirms the point that the type of political 
mechanism which exists affects economic factors . 
However, the study of constitutional rules may be considered pri-
marily the function of the political scientist rather than the function 
of the economist . The economist cannot ignore the constitutional rules 
even if it is accepted that these rules ar e pri marily the concern of the 
political scientist . Taxation and the allocat ion of resources by the 
government is affected by the type of polit i cal mechanism which exists. 
Therefore, the suggested approach is that the economist accept the 
responsibility of defining the political situation which is assumed in 
his economic analysis. The economist also should accept the responsibi-
lity of being acquainted with the rationale of any given political mech-
anism and the effects of the gi ven mechani sm upon economi c factors. The 
first part of this chapter adopts this approach to consitutional r ules 
by reviewing one possible rational e fo r t he existence of the representative 
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form of government and by pointi ng out some of the implications which such 
1 
a political mechanism may have upon economic analysis. 
Constitutional rules only determine the role of government in the 
supply of public goods in the hypothetical political situation defined as 
political polypoly. Therefore, in most political situations, it is likely 
that policy rules will determine the role of government in the supply of 
public goods. These policy rules are directly the concern of the economist. 
There are an infinite number of possible policy rules which define 
an infinite number of roles of government in the supply of public goods . 
The second part of this chapter is an application of the model of the 
price theory of public finance suggested in Chapter V. The objective of 
the analysis is to indicate some of the implications of various possible 
policy rules to economic analysis . The particular rules analyzed were 
chosen because they can readily be treated with the particular formula-
tion of the price theory of public finance suggested in this disserta-
tion. Many more possible policy rules could be stated and should be 
analyzed but other frameworks of analysis may be necessary. Therefore, 
the analysis which is presented represents a suggested approach to the 
question of just what various possible policy rules mean in the economic 
analysis of the allocation of resources by the government to public goods . 
1The framework of this analysis and some of the conclusions are 
derived from t he work of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tull ock, The 
Calculus of Consent (Ann Ar~or, 1962) . 
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The Representative Constitutional Form of Government 
A representative constitutional government (political oligopoly) 
need not be opposed to rational behavior of an individual attempt i ng to 
maximize his satisfaction even though, on the surface at least, political 
polypoly is the ideal systemo Political polypoly may be considered to be 
the ideal form of governmental organization i n the sense that, under per-
feet conditions, it is neutral in its effect upon the individual's be-
havior in the consumption of privately produced goods (i oe o, the political 
mechanism works as efficiently as the market mechanism and the individual 
maximizes his satisfaction by equating the marginal utility per dollar's 
2 
worth of all goods, including public goods). 
The reason that a represen tative form of government is not inconsis-
tent with rational behavior of individuals is that there may be some 
3 
costs associated with the act of collective decision making . In other 
words, there may be costs associated with obtaining any specified number 
of individuals to vote in favor of any parti cular proposal and costs 
associated with taking a vote of all individuals on various quantities 
and various prices for a particular good . In the latter case, the costs 
can be expected to increase as the number of individuals increases. 
In the former case, the costs can be expected to increase as t he number 
of people necessary to vote in favor of a particular proposal i ncreases. 
2This is the question of neutrality mentioned earlier in r egard to 
Richard A. Musgrave's criticisms of the Lindahl model which was taken 
up in Chapter V. 
3 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, p o 44 . 
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The unanimity rule would, therefore, have the greatest cost of decision 
making associated with it. The conclusion is that it can be considered 
rational for an individual, attempting to maximize his satisfaction, to 
prefer the representative form of government over one which requires 
4 individuals to vote on the supply of each good produced by the government. 
This conclusion is even more likely to hold true, if there are addi-
tional constitutional rules establishing a system of checks and balances 
which limit the functions of the various branches of government so that 
the branches of government are somewhat analogous to the market organiza-
5 tion . The function of the legislative branch can be limited to the in-
terpretation of the quantity and price of particular goods desired by 
individuals of the society. The function of the executive branch can be 
limited to the determination of how to combine resources in the production 
of the goods determined as desirable by the legislative branch. The 
function of the judicial branch can be limited to the evaluation of 
whether or not the other two branches of government have acted within all 
of the constitutional rules established by the society . 
However, once established, with the legislative branch being estab-
lished to interpret the desires of all individual s of the society, the 
representatives that make up the l egislat i ve branch may come under t he 
pressures of minority groups of individuals organized to obtai n exclusive 
benefits for the group which are to be paid for by all of the indi viduals 
4 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
5 These may be considered as additional f ac tors to be considered as 
evidence that political pliopoly does exi s t . 
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6 
of the society. These pressure groups are a natural outgrowth of the 
system, if the assumptions about rational economic behavior are accepted 
because small groups of individuals find that they can gain more in bene-
7 fits than it costs to organize and obtain the benefits. The result is 
that the constitutional rules establishing the representative form of 
government do not operate as they were , intended to operate . The benefits 
from the goods supplied by the government become separated from the costs 
(taxes). The majority of the society~ rather than the minority of the 
society, must adjust their private consumption to maximize their satis-
faction as a result of the government supply of goods. 
The unanimity principle in the political process has been suggested 
as a theoretical answer to the problem of tax-justice (i.e. , the elimina-
tion of coercion in taxation) .8 Under political polypoly, the unanimity 
rule creates greater costs of decision making but may in certain situations 
eliminate coercion9 since a tax may not be considered to be coercive if 
6 DeMarco's conclusions about pressure groups are similar but . stated 
in terms of his own framework of analysis. The pressure groups are con-
sidered to be evidence of a monopolistic element in government . The con-
clusions are that if capital owning pressure groups win, higher prices 
must be paid to private firms, and, if labor pressure. groups win, higher 
prices will have to be paid in the form of higher costs of production. 
First Principles .Qf. Public Finance, p . 50 . 
7 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, pp . 286-287 . 
8 See the analysis of the Wicksell-Lindahl model in Chapter III. 
9The situation where the unanimity rule would be ne cessary woul d be 
where political polypoly existed but the good in quest ion had the charac-
teristic of jointness of supply and where another rule existed requiring 
the same price to be charged all taxpayers . 
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every individual has agreed to it in advance by voting for the specified 
tax for specified quantities of the goods to be supplied. In the repre-
sentative form of government (political oligopoly), the unanimity rule 
does not eliminate coercion unless two further assumptions are accepted: 
(1) the representatives do vote exactly as the individuals whom they re-
10 present would vote, and (2) the representatives do represent equal num-
bers of individuals of the society. However, even in the case where these 
assumptions are not acceptedp the unanimity rule may be a part of the 
constitutional rules rationally chosen by the individuals of the society. 
The costs of decision making in alternative systems may make it so that 
individuals prefer an imperfect system. In other words, the individuals 
decide that there are more social (external) costs associated with having 
any alternative set of constitutional rules than there are benefits to be 
gained by having the alternate rules. The unanimity rule is one possible 
rule which is included in the set of constitutional rules in an at t empt 
to insure that the benefits to be gained by a change to an alternative set 
of constitutional rules are less than the social costs associated with it. 11 
lOThis assumption implies that all individuals represented by a given 
representative have the same utility function for all public goods. 
11 Buchanan and Tul lock suggest another possible constitutional rule 
or government policy rule which might be mo~e practical in a society 
where pressure groups have already developed and are believed to have an 
effect upon the representative in his decisi on making process. The rule 
would require that all goods which benefit a particular minority group 
be paid for by special taxation of another equal in size minority group . 
The logic of this rule is to establish a basis for countervailing powers 
to operate without causing a growth in the countervail i ng powers. The 
Calculus of Consent, pp . 291-294. 
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It might be accepted as a valid conclusion that, no matter which of 
the possible constitutional rules exist p coercion does not exist as long 
12 
as unanimity exists concerning the existing constitutional rules . In 
other words, as long as each individual in the society agrees to the 
existing constitutional rules ~ it can be assumed t hat they bel i eve that 
the gains to be derived f rom changing to any al ternat ive set of rules do 
13 
not equal the costs of making the change . However, some of the costs 
of changi ng to an alternative se t of const i tutional r ules may be the 
direct result of the existing constitutional rules r egarding the process 
of changi ng constitutional rules . Thereforep the question of whether or 
not coercion can be said to exist under a condition where the constitu-
tional rules are no t functioning as they were i nt ended to function but 
where unanimity exists in regard to keeping t he exist ing constitutional 
rules is a problem beyond the scope of thi.s analysis . 
At least it can be said t hat t he dete rminates of the political 
situation which exis t s are t he constitutional rules and policy rules 
under which the government opera t es . The ro l e of government in the pro-
duction of pub lic goodsp however, is indeterminate in political oligopoly 
and all other political situations except political polypoly . Therefore, 
it is important to conside r various possible policy rules which do de fine 
the role of government in the production of public goods with the price 
theory of public finance as the framework . Each of the r emaining sections 
12 Ibid . , pp . 250-253 . 
13 Ibid . , pp . 260-262 . 
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of this chapter treats a possible policy rule and some of the implications 
the rule may have for economic analysis. 
Public Goods Neutral as to the Optimum Allocation of Resources 
The model developed in Chapter V and presented i n Figure 16 is a 
statement of public goods being neutral as to the optimum allocation of 
resources. Therefore, all which was stated in the previous chapter is 
implied in considering this role of government. However, much more is 
also implied by adopting this concept . Before di s cussing some of these 
other implications i t may be best to clarify one of the possible results 
of the government not fulfilling this role of government . 
Figure 17 indicates the effect of government producing a smaller 
quantity of public goods than that which is necessary for the optimum 
allocation of resources . Point A represents the optimum allocation. 
Point B represents the allocation when the government produces a quantity 
which is not based upon the equality of the total demand for public goods 
and the marginal cost of producing the pub lic goods. The tax-price is 
still determined by the benefit theory of taxation and the price of pri-
vate goods is the same as would be determined in a purely competitive mar-
ket if the government did provide an optimum allocation of resources. 
Consumer satisfaction is not pr evented by the fact that the government did 
not fulfill its role of being neutral as to the optimum allocat i on of 
14 
resources. However, the optimum allocation of resources will not be 
14The maximization of individual satisfacti on is the result of tax-
pricing according to the benefit theory of taxation and is independent of 
the optimum allocation of resources . 
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achieved unless the government does produce the quantity of public goods 
based upon the tastes and preferences of individuals. The acceptance of 
this role of government appears to naturally follow from the economist's 
acceptance of the Pareto optimum allocation of resources for private goods 
but the implications of this acceptance to the role of government are not 
so readily acceptable. 
The assumption that income is given in the model (Figure 16) was 
discussed in Chapter V. The conclusion was that the given income does 
not imply that the given income is the 11best" distribution of income. The 
given income is not a distribution of actual income. The model does, how-
ever, imply which functional distribution of income is the ''best. 1115 
All actions of the government are assumed to be the result of attempt-
ing to obtain the optimum allocation of resources. This allocation of 
16 
resources implies a specific functional distribution of income. Once 
public goods are included with private goods in the determination of the 
allocation of resources, the functional distribution is likely to be nearly 
the same as the personal income distribution . 17 Therefore, a specific 
15The functional distribution of income is the income distribution 
resulting from the payment of wages, rentsp interest and profits to the 
owners of resources used in the production of goods . 
16It is assumed that the government has no role in changing the 
existing ownership of resources. 
17 The personal di stribution of income is the distribution of income 
irrespective of source . It may include transfer payments p gifts, etc . which 
are not included in the functional distribution . 
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personal income distribution is virtually implied in the model and it must 
be accepted as the "best" distribution given the original expected incomes 
of individuals. 
Another assumption of the model which has special significance in 
regard to the role of government is the assumption that pure competition 
exists in the production of private goods . The Pareto optimum cannot be 
achieved unless pure competition exists. Therefore, it is implied that 
the role of government extends government activities to activities taken 
to achieve purely competitive markets . In fact, it is implied that the 
government should either take over the production of all goods not pro-
duced in purely competitive markets or set prices according to marginal costs 
in those markets so as to bring about the same allocation of resources. 18 
Still another necessary assumption in t he mod~l is the assumption 
that individuals do reveal their true preferences . The implication is that 
political polypoly exists as the political situation . At leastp it must 
be assumed that in some way voters do express their true preferences for 
public goods, because if not, the result may be something like that illus-
trated in Figure 17 where benefit theory taxation existed but not an opti-
mum allocation of resources. Therefore, a voting process must exist which 
permits voters to vote for the various prices they are willing to pay for 
various quantities. 
18 This was the role of government proposed by Knut Wicksell . See 
Carl G. Uhr, Economic Doctrines of Knut Wicksell (Ber keley ~ 1960) . 
124 
Pareto Optimum Allocation of Resources as a Standard of Reference 
The policy rule of government of obtaining the optimum allocation of 
resources may very well be modified because of some of the assumptions and 
implications inherent in this approach to the role of government . The 
economic justification for modifying the role of government is basically 
the same as it was for saying that it was rational for individuals to 
choose a representative form of government instead of having a political 
19 
situation which more closely corresponds to poli tical polypoly . The 
additional costs of decision making are greater than the value to .be gained 
by obtaining the optimum allocation of resources. Also, the additional 
costs of having the government produce all goods not produced in a purely 
competitive market may be greater than the value to be gained by obtaining 
the optimum allocation of resources. It is not certai n that additional 
costs would be involved but the government must control its production by 
policy rules and must maintain a means of seeing to it that the policy 
rules are carried out . The market mechani sm on the other hand operates 
to bring about an allocation of resources by pr oducers attempting to 
maximize their profit . In the case of the government supply of goods, 
therefore, the cost of producing the same good might be more than if the 
good were produced by private profit seeking firrns o In any case, it 
appears that individuals might rationally choose a role for government 
which does not require the government to obtai n the Pareto opti mum al l o-
cation of resources . 
19 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullockj The Calculus of Consent 
(Ann Arbor, 1962) . 
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If the Pareto optimum allocation of resources is accepted merely as 
a standard of reference rather than as a policy rule regulating the govern-
ment's activities, the model presented in Figure 16 is still the basis for 
the evaluation of the role of government o However, the interpretation of 
the implications of the assumptions used in the model is changed o 
The functional distribution of income resul ting from the optimum 
allocation of resources is still considered as the "best" income distri-
bution o However, it need not be the income distribution which actually 
results from the production of public goods o The Pareto optimum allocation 
of resources and its resulting functional distribution of income does not 
have to be obtained because the role of government is just to use the 
optimum as a standard of reference o 
The government may also use the purely competitive market i n t he pro-
duction of private goods as a standard of reference o Act i ons should be 
taken to bring about pure competition but the cost of these actions should 
also be taken into consideration . Also, the political polypoly situation 
may be considered as the standard of refe rence but a representative form 
of government (political oligopoly) may be accepted . This acceptance of 
political oligopoly is valid especially if other poli cy rules exis t which 
20 indicate the presence of political pliopoly . 
The role of government in this case is not clear ly defined . It is 
dependent upon the ability of the poli tical mechanism to obtain the in-
formation about the tastes and preferences of individuals both i n regard 
to the production of public goods and i n r egard to the extent to which the 
20 See Chapter VI . 
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government should act to obtain pure competition in the markets for pri-
vate goods o However~ the stairting p laic:e for analyzing the role of govern-
ment is still the Pareto optimum allocation of resources. The government 
should act to obtain this alloc:a,tion of resources unless it is determined 
that the individuals of society consider the costs of obtaining this 
allocation greater than the value to be gained from obtaining it. 
The problems of achieving this role of government are many but most 
of them are practical rather than theoretJt.cal o Practical limitations 
exist for all of the possible roles of government and it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to say whi,r::h role of government has the greatest problems 
of applicationo Therefore, they will not be discussed here. 
Public Goods Neutral as to Prices of Private Goods 
Another possible role of government is that public goods are to be 
produced to maximize production of goods without affecting the existing 
prices of private goodso 
Figure 18 presents a model showing this role of governmento The mar-
ket price of private goods is asaumed to be given as a result of whatever 
21 
market situation actually exists in the production of the private goodso 
The government has no responsibility to modify the market structure. How-
ever, the quantity of the private good which :iis taken by consumers is per-
mitted to vary o Only the price of private) goods is not to be affected o 
21The model assumes monopolistic ma:rkets exist in the production of 
private goodso If pure competition did exis:t the mode:l would be the same 
as shown in Figure 160 
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Thereforei, the government determines the quantity and tax-price for public 
go,ode so that the ind:l!.vidua.1 will max1mhe his saU.sfa.ction by only ad-
justing the quantity of pr:l:.v.ate goods he purchases. 
The resulting dia:tdbution :Lis considered to be the "best" but very 
little can be said about what it would be. It would probably be close to 
the existing distribution of income since the price of private goods is 
not changed. However, the quantity of private goods taken may change. 
Therefore, the resulting distribution of income may be different than the 
original functional di.st:ribution of income. 
The role of government in tax-pddng can still be in accordance with 
the benefit theory of taxation, as is shown in the model. The individual, 
therefore, is able to maximize his satisfaction. The government adjusts 
the quantity of production to ma.ximize the total production of goods with-
out affecting the price of private goods a The resulting tax-price may not 
be based on t:he marginal costs of produ,~tiono It is possible that the 
government may have to charge a tax-price less than the marginal costs of 
production in order to maximize production without affecting the price of 
private goodso It is also possible that the quantity of private goods 
taken would also increase as a result of the government producing goods 
and selling them. at less than the m.arginal costs of producing the public 
22 goods. 
22 In this case, it is assumed that more income would be created by 
the govemment production of goods than would be spent as taxes in payment 
for the public goods. 
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Public Goods Neutral as to the Private Sector of the Economy 
Figure 19 is a model of the government producing public goods so as 
not to affect the production of goods in the private sector of the economy. 
The methodology used in the model is the same as before with the exception 
that both the price and quantity of p1dv.aite goods is given instead of just 
the price. The government adjusts its production of public goods so that 
neither the existing price nor the existing quantity of private goods is 
affected. The "best" distribution of inc.ome is considered to be the 
existing functional distribution of i.ncome. 23 
The role of government in tax-pricing can be in accordance with the 
benefit theory of taxation as shown in the model when individual A is 
assumed to take quantity OQ of the private good and individual Bis assumed 
to take quantity OK of the private goodo The individuals are still able 
to maximize their satisfaction in this case. However, since the govern-
ment 's role is to affect nei their:· price noir quant:i. ty of private goods, the 
consistencies of the demand for private atnd public goods with the benefit 
24 theory of tax-pricing is an exceptional case. 
The existing quantity of private goods must be consistent with a 
single quantity of public goods when the equal comiumption definition for 
23 The only change in the exhting functional distdbution of income 
is that the government also makes payments of wages, rents, interest and 
profits which might be different than the payments which existed beforeo 
24 Whether or not the government should prive ~ccording to the marginal 
costs of production cannot be stated. without morce definite .JLssumptions about 
these costs and the existing market structure. 
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25 
a public good is usedo If the assume.d quantity of private goods 
taken by individual A had been OR instead of OQ, the government could not-
use the benefit theory of tax-pricing and still accomplish its role since 
individual A would only want OU quantity of the public goodo If the 
government did reduce the production of the public good to the quantity 
OU, individual B would only want OS quantity of private goods instead of 
the originally assumed quantity OKo Therefore, the government is unable 
to apply the benefit theory of taxation to fulfill its role of being neu-
tral to the production of private goods unless the quantity of private 
goods taken happens to be consistent with a single quantity of public 
goodso 
It may be assumed that the goveI'nment can still produce quantity OG 
of the public good by cha~ging individual A the tax-price given by the SC 
line of attainable combinations" In this case, the government does not 
affect the price or quantity of private goods which is taken but indi-
vidual A is not satisfied with the quantity of public goods which he re-
ceiveso26 Therefore, the government may have to exert its unique position 
in the production of goods to accomplish the role of being neutral as to 
the private sector of the economyo 
25 If the equal consumption definition of a public good is rejected, 
the individual can adjust the quantity of public goods so as to maximize 
individual satisfactiono 
26In this case, taxes become more coercive than prices determined in 
the marketo 
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It is suggested in this iehapte.r that the economist is not primarily 
concerned with the factors determining constitutional rules but that 
he should understand the rationale behind the existing constitutional rules 
and the implications that these niles may have upon his analysis o 
The analysis indicated that e,ven though political polypoly is the 
least coercive type of political situation, the individual may rationally 
choose to live in a political oligopoly situation because of the costs of 
making decisions in political polypolyo The existence of political oli-
gopoly~ however;, may lead to the creation of pressure. groups o Pressure 
groups in turn lead to a greater degree of coerciono Other constitutional 
and policy rules may exist which tend to make the situation less coercive 
than it otherwise would beo 
The role of government in the pr,oduction of goods is not necessarily 
specified by the constitutional :rule.so However,, the policy rules of 
government may define the role of government in the. production of goods, 
The optimum allocation of resources provides one possible policy rule of 
government which defines the role of go·1yernment in the production of goods o 
It is implied by this rule that the govell'.'Ilment should produce all goods 
which could not be produced under condltions :of pure competitiono It is 
also implied that the government has a role to perform in insuring that 
pure competition does exist iri the p:rnduction of all goods produced in the 
pitivate market sector of the ec.onom.yo 
The optim'Ulm allocation of resources may also be accepted only as a 
:standard of reference for the gove:rnme.nt: in the production of goods o In 
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this case, the role of government is t o provide marginal cost pricing in 
the production and sale of all goods when the individuals of society con-
sider the gains to be obtained by the act ions taken by the government are 
greater than the costs of taking the action . Thus, it would be accepted 
t hat a less than optimum allocati on of resources might be rationally chosen 
by the i ndivi duals of society when the costs of obtaining the optimum 
would be greater than the i ndividuals ' evaluation of the gain to be ob-
tained from havi ng the op timum allocation of resources . 
Another policy rule which is consistent wi th the benefit t heory of 
tax-pricing is that the government should provide maximum production of 
goods without affecti ng prices determined in the existing market structure 
of society. The government would have no role in determining the market 
structure and would provide public goods at a tax-price equal t o or less 
than t he marginal costs of pr oduction . The private production of goods 
would be affected by the actions of government but not the prices of goods 
produced in the private sector of the economy. 
Still another possible po licy rule for government is that the govern-
ment should maintai n the existing market structure of the economy. Both 
prices and quantities taken of privately produced goods are not to be 
affected by the ac tions of the government in the production of public 
goods . In this case , t he role of government is only consisten t with t he 
benefi t t heory of tax-pricing if the equal consumption def i nition of a 
public good is rejected or if the market determined quantities and prices 
of private goods are assumed to be consisten t with the tastes and preferences 
of individuals for t he private goods and a single quantity of public goods . 
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If neither of these conditions are accepted, this policy rule of govern-
ment implies a role of government which is inconsistent with the price 
theory of public financeo 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance had its 
origin in the writings of economists from continental Europe during the 
nineteenth century. The theory represents an expansion of the benefit 
theory of taxation and price theory analysis to the problem of allocating 
resources to the production of public goods. The expansion of economic 
analysis to public goods requires that the political process be taken into 
consideration. Pantaleoni, an I tal ian economist, di d recognize the 
necessity of considering the operation of the political process . In 
fact, Pantaleoni's writings emphasized the way in which the political pro-
cess operated in determining the allocation of resources to public goods . 
Mazzola, another Italian economist 9 followed Pantaleoni's political 
approach to some extent. However 9 Mazzola also emphasized the character-
istics of a good which made it a public good . 
In Sweden , Wicksell and Lindahl also recognized the necessity for 
considering the political process and the way in which the process de -
termined the actual allocation of resources to publi c goods . Howeverp 
Wicksell and Lindahl gave greater emphasis t o t he concept of individual 
choice of publi c goods . Indivi dual preferences for publi c goods were 
considered to be the standard by which the government should try to 
adjust its process of allocating resources . 
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Sax, in Germany, attempted to integrate the political approach of 
Pantaleoni and the individualistic approach of Lindahl into a new formu-
lation of the voluntary exchange theory. In the process, Sax emphasized 
the practical consideration that the political process cannot operate in 
a manner which would satisfy all individuals. Sax, however, held that the 
theory was applicable to the real world because the government could 
approximate the conditions necessary to satisfy individuals by following 
certain expenditure and tax pol i cies. 
DeViti DeMarco, another Italian, applied the whole of price theory 
analysis to t he concepts of public finance. He did not attempt to 
formulate a new framework of analysis . Instead, DeViti DeMarco's work 
represents an application of price theory analysis to the problems of 
explaini ng and interpreting exis ting concepts in public finance. 
American economists did not acti vely participate in the early develop-
ment of the vo luntary exchange theory. However, since Musgrave's criti-
cisms of the Lindahl formulation of t he theory, American economists appear 
to have taken a greater interest i n the theory. The works of Bowen, 
Kafoglis and Buchanan are significant contributions both to the under-
standing of the theory and to the appl ication of the theory tc specific 
allocation problems . Nevertheless, the criticisms raised by Musgrave and 
others have never been adequately analyzed. Apparently, the criticisms 
have been generally accepted by economists . The application of the theory 
has, therefore, been limited to allocation problems where the cricicisms 
could be avoided . 
The emphasis of this dissertati on has been upon the criticisms which 
stand as s t umbling blocks to the fut~re acceptance and applica t ion of 
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the voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance . The criticisms 
were divided into those related to revealed preferences of individuals 
and t hose related to the ope r ati on of the political process o In each 
case, a suggested approach was also presentedo 
The first of the criticisms related to the revealing of preferences 
is that an i ndividual will not r eveal his true preferences for public 
goods . The analysis indicates that the criticism is not sufficient reason 
to entirely reject the theoryo A process of r evealing preferences was 
presented which showed that an i ndividual i s motivated to reveal his pre-
ferences because if he does not the quantity of the public good supplied 
at his tax-price will be inconsistent with his preferences for the public 
good o It was also sugges t ed t hat t he individual must reveal his pre-
ferences if he is go i ng to maximize his satisfaction from all goods which 
provide satisfaction o The basic assumption appears to be whether or not 
individuals have pr eferences for publ ic goods and not whether or not they 
actually reveal the preferenceso 
The second criticism rel a ted to the reveal i ng of preferences is 
that even if preferences were revealed there i s no single bes t solut i on 
i n the allocation of resources to public goods analogous to the Pareto 
opt imum solution in the case of pri vate goods o The analysis indicat ed 
t ha t the criticism was based upon the particular mode l used by Musgr ave 
to state the criticismo The Musgrave-Samuelson model was present ed with 
public goods and then with j ust priva te goods o The r esult was that an 
infinite number of solutions was shown to exist even when just private 
goods are considered o The difficul t y appears to be t hat the model app lies 
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methodology which is consistent with a bar ter exchange economy instead of 
a monetary and production economy o 
A suggested approach to the price theory of public finance was pre-
sented. Basicallyp the approach represents an attempt to modify the 
Musgrave-Samuelson model in order to make i t more consistent with price 
theory analysis and with a monetary and production economy. The modified 
model was developed with just private goods to show the Pareto optimum 
solution and to make clear the conditions which must be met to have a 
single best solution analogous to the Paretci optimum when public goods 
are considered in the model o Then the model was developed with public 
goods o A single best solution analogous to the Pareto optimum solution 
was found to exist o The modifications in the Musgrave-Samuelson model 
which were necessary to determine a "bes t " solution were the holding of 
income constant and given and t he using of price consumpt i on lines as de-
mand schedules for the two goods o Cr iticisms which might develop from the 
two modifications of the Musgrave-Samuelson model were also discussed. 
The criticisms related to the political process were also broken 
into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with taxes 
as a means of payment for goods and services o The second category is 
concerned wi th the political mechanism as a means of determining t axes 
and output for public goods . 
The analysis of taxes as a means of payment indicat ed that taxes 
are no more coercive than prices o Bo th taxes and prices are compulsory 
payments once the amounts to be collected or pai d have been determi ned o 
In a market society an individual must pay the price fo r goods and 
services once i t i s agreed upon just as he must pay the tax once it i s 
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agreed upon. The difference between taxes and prices, if there is a 
difference, must be the result of the manner in which agreement is reached. 
If taxation is more coercive than pricing, it is because taxes are de-
termined in the political process while prices are determined in the 
market process . 
The political mechanism as a means of determining taxes and output 
for public goods was analyzed by defining various possible political 
situations in terms similar to those accepted in defining various market 
situati ons. Political polypoly was found to be the only situation where 
the political mechanism was no more coercive than the corresponding mar-
ket mechanism, market polypoly. However, the real world political situa-
tion is more likely to correspond to political oligopoly. Therefore, it 
was concluded that the political mechanism in the determination of taxes 
and output is likely to be more coercive than the market mechanism in 
the determination of prices and output . To some extent the criticisms 
of the voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance related to 
the political process are substantiated . However, the role of govern-
ment in the production of public goods is not determined by the constitu-
tional rules which establish the situation defined as political oligopoly . 
Therefore, other factors defined as resulting in political pliopoly and 
the policy rules of government which exist in any given political situa-
tion are important to the economic analysis of the allocation of resources 
to public goods . 
A suggested approach to the problems of analyzing constitutional 
rules and the role of government i n the producti on of public goods was 
made . It was suggested that constitutional rules are primarily the 
140 
concern of the political scientist and not of the economist . Howeverj 
the economist should be acquainted with the rationale behind the existing 
political situation and with some of the factors associated with the 
situation which might have an effect upon economic analysis. Therefore, 
the rationale behi nd the acceptance of a representative form of govern-
ment by individuals and some of the factors associat ed with the repre-
sentative form of government which might affect economic analysis were 
presented o 
It was suggested that the economist is directly concerned with 
policy rules of government when the rules determine the role of government 
in the production of public goods . Therefore, the suggested modified 
model of the price theory of public finance was used to analyze some of 
the possible policy rules which do determi ne the role of government in 
the production of public goods . The analysis indicated that the vari ous 
policy rules do hold imp lications which are i mportant to economic analysis . 
Of even greater i mportance to the theme of this di ssertation, the analysis 
also indicat ed that the model of the price theory of public finance may 
be useful as an analytical tool . 
The appl i cability and limitat ions of the price theory of public 
finance to three broad areas of study are considered in the r emainder of 
this chapter . The three areas of appl i cation are (1) as an explanation 
of the real world, (2) as a framework for policy proposals, and (3) as 
a framework for discussi ng concepts of publ i c finance . 
Applicability and Limitations of the Theory as an Explanation 
of the Real World 
The political mechanism which is necessary for the government to 
be able to provide an optimum allocation of resources is not likely to 
exist in the real world. Therefore, political polypoly is not an ex-
planation of the operation of the political process in the real world. 
Neither is the optimum allocation of resources model an explanation of 
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the actual allocation of resources by the government in the real world. 
These limitations are obvious to even the casual observer of the actual 
political process who understands the necessary conditions of political 
polypoly and of the optimum allocation of resources model. However, this 
consideration does not have to affect the acceptance of the price theory 
of publ i c finance as an explanation of real world events. The same type 
of observations can be made in relation to the pure competition model 
and the real world market situations. Market oligopoly is the most 
likely market situation in the real world just as political oligopoly is 
the most l i ke l y poli tical situat i on . The difference wh i ch affects the 
relative acceptabil i ty of the two frameworks of analysis lies in the 
fact that the economic implications of market oligopoly have been 
developed and studied by leading economists of England and the United 
States while the economic i mplications of political oligopoly have never 
been systemati cally set forth . The deve l opment of precise definit i ons 
for political situations and of analysis of the economic i mplications 
of pol i tical situat i ons is essenti a l to t he fu t ur e applicat i on of the 
price theory of public f i nance to real wor ld situat i ons . 
The political polypoly model which does provide an optimum allo-
cation of resources is important to economi c analysis even if it does 
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not provide an explanation of the operati on of the real world political 
process or of the operation of the r eal world allocation of resources to 
publ i c goods . In a democratic representative society, it is likely that 
the general principles of the op t imum allocation of resources model can 
be applied to specific real world allocation problems. Two broad ex-
amples of application may be consi dered for i llustrative purposes. It 
can be considered that the increased allocation of resources to public 
goods during the r ecent history of t he United States can be explained as 
an increased demand for public goods relative to the demand for private 
goods . Also, the changing struc ture of government in the United States 
(i.e., the gr owth of federa l government relative to state and loca l 
governments and the growth of state governments relative to local govern-
ments) may be explained in terms of t he inability of smaller units of 
government to obtain the economies of scale which are possible in the 
production of those publ ic goods which have had an increased demand . 
The two examples of appli cation are only of i mportance in that they 
indicate the possi bility of applying the general pri nciples of the price 
theory of public finance to real world events. The i mpor tant application 
of the general pri nciples of supply and demand theor y is i n the area of 
specific a llocation problems such as the allocation of r esources to edu-
cation, highways, public health, etc. The general equi l ibrium model of 
the optimum allocat i on of resources is not t he appr opri ate model for 
analyzing these speci fic allocation problems . The general principles 
of price theory analysisp however~ do provide t he necessary tools of 
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analysis. The question of which tools of analysis are most appropriate 
depend upon the situation being investigated. 
In any case, there is no apparent reason why the tools of price 
theory analysis would not provide insights into the allocation of re-
sources to public goods i n the real world . The political situation which 
exists will have to be taken int o consideration but this limitation is 
not sufficient reason for rejecting price theory tools of analysis. 
App licabili ty and Limitations of the Theory as a Framework 
for Policy Proposals 
The hypothetical political situation defined as political polypoly 
and the optimum allocation of resources model do provide objective cri-
teria fo r making policy proposals . However j there are many problems of 
applyi ng the conditions of the hypothetical situation and of the model to 
real world allocation problems . Whether or not these problems of appli-
cation can be overcome cannot be known until attempts are made to inter-
pret the concepts into specific proposals . In any casej it is likely 
that any proposals for sweeping changes in the operation of government 
woul d not be accepted i n our society. Policy proposals by economists 
are called for by our society and by the gover nmental or ganizations which 
represent society . Therefore, as particular situations arise, the econo-
mist can make proposals which wi ll tend to make the operation of govern-
ment come closer to political polypoly and the producti on of public 
goods come closer to the optimum allocation of resources i f the theore-
tical concepts can be interpreted into r easonable policy proposals . 
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Political polypoly as a hypothetical set of constitutional rules is 
primarily the concern of the political scientist. However, the economist 
may very well be concerned with proposed changes in constitutional rules 
which affect the government's ability to interpret the demands of indi-
viduals for public goods. One example of such a change can be considered 
for illustrative purposes . The state of Oklahoma has considered several 
proposed changes in its constitution relating to representation in its 
legislative branch. A nonpopulation basis for representation is likely 
to result in the favored group having a gr eater vote in the allocation of 
resources by the state. The economist has a responsibility to point ou t 
what effects the various proposals might have upon the allocation of re-
sources . 
The optimum allocation of resources model and policy rules which de-
termine the role of government in the production of public goods are 
more directly the concern of the economist. This fact does not imply 
that the economist should propose a policy rule that will make the opti-
mum allocation of resources the role of government in t he product ion of 
public goods . Such a policy rule would probab l y not be accepted by our 
society . Other considerations must be taken i nto considerat i on . These 
other considerat ions , however, do no t prevent the economist from evalu-· 
ating specific proposals in particular situations and stating whether 
or not the proposal will cause the allocation of resources to mo r e 
closely correspond to the optimum allocation than the present allocation 
of resources. In other words, the optimum allocation of resource s can 
serve as a standard of reference for poli cy proposals by economises . 
I?.many specific allocation problems ~ it may be that t he proposal based 
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upon the optimum allocation of resources would be acceptable to our society . 
The problems of measurement and interpr etation of the situation in this 
case would be the primary stumbling blocks to the acceptance of the pro-
posals. In any case, the price theory of public finance provides the 
theoretical framework for objectively analyzing policy proposals . Whether 
or not the proposals would be accepted by our society with our existing 
political situation can only be answered when specific proposals are 
actually made . 
Appli cability and Limitations of the Theory as a Framework 
for Discussing Concepts of Public Finance 
The area of most importance to the present application of the price 
theory of public finance i s t hat of discuss i ng concepts of public fi -
nance . Future applications of t he theory to spec ific allocation problems 
ultimately depends upon whether or not economists t hink of public fi-
nance in terms of applying price theory concepts to public goods . If 
economis ts discuss public finance concepts in terms of price theory con-
ceptsj the application of the theory to specif ic probl ems will mor e or 
less naturally follow . 
DeViti DeMarco 's work is a classic example of what can be done in 
this area . The general principles of price theory analysis can be applied 
to existing concept s i n public f i nance . The basic pr oblem l ies in the 
economi st 1 s existi ng views that the gover nment ac ts in an arbi trary manner 
not related to the demands of society for public goods and that taxes 
are coercive payments . Taxes can be discussed as prices pai d for t he 
goods and services produced by the government. The government can be 
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discussed a s a producer of e conomic goodso It may be necessary to recog-
nize the fact that the political process is likely to be more coercive 
than the market process in the allocation of resources. Thi~ limitation 
need not interfere with discussing the production of public goods in 
t erms of the process being a transaction which has a payment side and a 
production side t hat are determi ned by supply and demand. 
Kafoglis ' work in defining public goods in terms of the existence 
of external economies and diseconomies is another example of what can be 
done to apply price theory concepts to t he discussion of concepts of 
public finance . It is conce ivable to define public finance as the study 
of goods which have the characteristics of external economies or external 
diseconomies . Any good wi t h t hese characteristics is of public concern. 
It, therefore, may be considered as a public good even if it is not pre-
sently produced by the government . I n any case, it appears that a great 
deal more work can be done in the ar ea of def i ning public goods as to the 
characteristics of . the goods . Nat ional defense can be discussed as a 
good with the characteristic of jointness of consumption. The allocation 
of resources to national defense can be discussed in t erms of the supply 
and demand for national defense . The fact that the existing political 
mechanism cannot perfectly measure t he demand must enter the discuss ion 
but this need no t interfere with the discussion of national de fense as a 
public good . 
The discussion of problems of employment and national income which 
have become i mport ant i n t he area of fi s cal policy of gover nment are no t 
readily adaptable to the price theory frame.work. Therefore, it is rea-
s~nable to assume that i t wi ll be necessary to maintain elements of 
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aggregate analysis in the discussion of public finance concepts. However, 
the use of general equilibrium frameworks which are based on price theory 
concepts by Gurley and Shaw and Patinkin in the area of monetary theory 
may indicate that this type of framework can be applied to other areas. 
The relationship of employment and national income to the price theory 
of public finance represents another area of future development of theory. 
The main point-to be made is that the future development and appli-
cation of the voluntary exchange or price theory of public finance de-
pends to a large extent upon the application of the general principles 
of price theory analysis to existing concepts of public finance. If and 
when economists discuss taxes as prices, the government as a producer, 
the activities of government as public goods, and the allocation of re-
sources by government based upon supply and demand, the price theory of 
public finance will be applied to specific problems of government. 
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